16 mar 2013
‘Israel uses AMIA case to thwart Iran-LatAm relations’
File photo shows bombed AMIA building in Buenos Aires
A top Iranian diplomat says Israel uses the case of 1994 AMIA Jewish center bombing in the Argentinean capital, Buenos Aires, to obstruct the development of relations between Iran and Latin American states.
“Iran has been charged of being connected with the AMIA incident by a regime which pursues state terrorism. The Zionist regime [of Israel] has been trying hard to disrupt Iran’s regular activities within Latin American countries under the pretext of AMIA bombing incident,” Ramin Mehmanparast said in an interview with IRNA on Saturday.
Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesman added that the Israeli regime has been trying to falsely accuse the Islamic Republic of being involved in terrorist activities despite the fact that the Iranian nation is the biggest victim of terrorism and has always made every effort to eliminate this sinister phenomenon.
“The Zionist regime [of Israel] is still one of the biggest threats to security and stability in all regions including Latin America and this illegitimate regime should not be allowed to have a negative impact on the relations between Iran and the Latin American countries,” Mehmanparast noted.
He also pointed to the recent agreement between Iran and Argentina to set up an international truth commission to investigate the AMIA incident, saying that for the first time efforts are being made to shed light on the truth behind the AMIA incident.
On January 27, Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi and his Argentinean counterpart, Hector Timerman, signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to shed light on the AMIA bombing in Buenos Aires which left 85 people dead. AMIA stands for the Asociacion Mutual Israelita Argentina or the Argentine Israelite Mutual Association.
Argentina’s Senate on February 21 gave the green light to the agreement with Iran on the AMIA case with the senators voting 39-31 in favor of the MoU. Argentinean lawmakers later signed the agreement into law after a 14-hour session with 131 ayes against 113 nays.
Argentinean President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner and Timerman have also endorsed the agreement, which stipulates that the fact-finding commission, composed of five foreign legal experts, should issue a report after carrying out an evaluation of Argentina’s investigation into the issue.
Under intense political pressure from the US and Israel, Argentina had formally accused Iran of having carried out the bomb attack. The Islamic Republic has categorically denied any involvement in the terrorist bombing.
A top Iranian diplomat says Israel uses the case of 1994 AMIA Jewish center bombing in the Argentinean capital, Buenos Aires, to obstruct the development of relations between Iran and Latin American states.
“Iran has been charged of being connected with the AMIA incident by a regime which pursues state terrorism. The Zionist regime [of Israel] has been trying hard to disrupt Iran’s regular activities within Latin American countries under the pretext of AMIA bombing incident,” Ramin Mehmanparast said in an interview with IRNA on Saturday.
Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesman added that the Israeli regime has been trying to falsely accuse the Islamic Republic of being involved in terrorist activities despite the fact that the Iranian nation is the biggest victim of terrorism and has always made every effort to eliminate this sinister phenomenon.
“The Zionist regime [of Israel] is still one of the biggest threats to security and stability in all regions including Latin America and this illegitimate regime should not be allowed to have a negative impact on the relations between Iran and the Latin American countries,” Mehmanparast noted.
He also pointed to the recent agreement between Iran and Argentina to set up an international truth commission to investigate the AMIA incident, saying that for the first time efforts are being made to shed light on the truth behind the AMIA incident.
On January 27, Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi and his Argentinean counterpart, Hector Timerman, signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to shed light on the AMIA bombing in Buenos Aires which left 85 people dead. AMIA stands for the Asociacion Mutual Israelita Argentina or the Argentine Israelite Mutual Association.
Argentina’s Senate on February 21 gave the green light to the agreement with Iran on the AMIA case with the senators voting 39-31 in favor of the MoU. Argentinean lawmakers later signed the agreement into law after a 14-hour session with 131 ayes against 113 nays.
Argentinean President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner and Timerman have also endorsed the agreement, which stipulates that the fact-finding commission, composed of five foreign legal experts, should issue a report after carrying out an evaluation of Argentina’s investigation into the issue.
Under intense political pressure from the US and Israel, Argentina had formally accused Iran of having carried out the bomb attack. The Islamic Republic has categorically denied any involvement in the terrorist bombing.
13 mar 2013
IAEA admits Iran nuclear energy program peaceful
Indian Foreign Secretary Ranjan Mathai (R) shakes hands with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Yukiya Amano during a press conference in New Delhi on March 13, 2013
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has acknowledged that Iran is using its nuclear energy program solely for peaceful purposes.
“Iran has a comprehensive agreement with the IAEA and Iran is subject to UN Security Council resolutions which are legally binding. This is the standard,” IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano said at a joint press conference with Indian Foreign Secretary Ranjan Mathai on Wednesday.
"In light of this standard, I can say that declared activities and material of Iran are staying in peaceful purposes,” Amano told reporters in New Delhi.
He stressed that the West’s dispute over Iran’s nuclear program should come to an end “through diplomatic means and dialogue.”
"I will continue the dialogue with Iran and hope that we can report positive results through our next meeting in June," he said, referring to the next meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors.
The United States, Israel, and some of their allies have repeatedly accused Iran of pursuing non-civilian objectives in its nuclear energy program.
Iran rejects the allegations, arguing that as a committed signatory to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and a member of the IAEA, it has the right to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.
In addition, the IAEA has conducted numerous inspections of Iran’s nuclear facilities but has never found any evidence showing that Iran’s civilian nuclear program has been diverted to nuclear weapons production.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has acknowledged that Iran is using its nuclear energy program solely for peaceful purposes.
“Iran has a comprehensive agreement with the IAEA and Iran is subject to UN Security Council resolutions which are legally binding. This is the standard,” IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano said at a joint press conference with Indian Foreign Secretary Ranjan Mathai on Wednesday.
"In light of this standard, I can say that declared activities and material of Iran are staying in peaceful purposes,” Amano told reporters in New Delhi.
He stressed that the West’s dispute over Iran’s nuclear program should come to an end “through diplomatic means and dialogue.”
"I will continue the dialogue with Iran and hope that we can report positive results through our next meeting in June," he said, referring to the next meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors.
The United States, Israel, and some of their allies have repeatedly accused Iran of pursuing non-civilian objectives in its nuclear energy program.
Iran rejects the allegations, arguing that as a committed signatory to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and a member of the IAEA, it has the right to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.
In addition, the IAEA has conducted numerous inspections of Iran’s nuclear facilities but has never found any evidence showing that Iran’s civilian nuclear program has been diverted to nuclear weapons production.
7 mar 2013
'US lies on Iran N-program exposed'
|
An analyst says the former head of IAEA's confirmation of Iran's nuclear program as solely for peace exposes US sanctions used as a barbaric tool of war against Iran. In the background of this former IAEA chief Hans Blax has come out and said there is no evidence and has never been evidence that Iran isn't even interested in producing weapons of mass destruction.
He said further that the threat of a nuclear Iran is "over-hyped". He confirmed that Iran has so far not at all violated the Nuclear Proliferation treaty and therefore no action can be justified against Iran in the form of sanctions, punishment or intimidation based on mere suspicions. Press TV has interviewed Saab Shaath, author and Middle East expert, Belfast about this issue. |
Iran Demands from IAEA Full Authorization To Finalize Parchin Negotiation
Ali Asghar Soltanieh, Iran’s Ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA
Iran’s Ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, Ali Asghar Soltanieh accused IAEA director general Mr. Yukiya Amano of “controlling the negotiations with Iran” during a press conference held on Wednesday March 6, 2013 outside the board of governors meeting room at the International Center in Vienna, demanding him to give full authorization to the negotiation team to finalize the negotiations “as it should be” and without interruption.
He said that the problem is not Iran but “the political control of the negotiation and the politicization of the role of the inspection of the Parchin team”, and stating that Iran is committed within the negotiations.
Iran’s Ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, Ali Asghar Soltanieh accused IAEA director general Mr. Yukiya Amano of “controlling the negotiations with Iran” during a press conference held on Wednesday March 6, 2013 outside the board of governors meeting room at the International Center in Vienna, demanding him to give full authorization to the negotiation team to finalize the negotiations “as it should be” and without interruption.
He said that the problem is not Iran but “the political control of the negotiation and the politicization of the role of the inspection of the Parchin team”, and stating that Iran is committed within the negotiations.
Today the Board of Governors re-appointed by acclamation the current Director General, Mr. Yukiya Amano, to a further term of office for four years, from 1 December 2013 to 30 November 2017. The Board extended to Mr. Amano its congratulations and best wishes on the occasion of his re-appointment. The appointment will be before the General Conference for its approval at its next regular session in September.
He added: “In my statement, which I delivered before the board of governors meeting, I clarified which are the obstacles hindering the negotiations with the republic of Iran since 10 years”. |
According to Ambassador Soltanieh, the IAEA director general’s hindering of the inspections of the Parchin site prior to signing the “Modality Plan” is unjustifiable and only politicizes the issue. After enforcing the new “Modality Plan”, Iran’s dossier should be closed and the IAEA Safeguard should be normalized, he said.
The press conference of Ambassador Soltanieh was held after a hot argument behind closed doors inside the IAEA Board of Governors meeting.
The speech of the Iranian representative is published in full below.
Statement by H.E. Ambassador Ali Asghar Soltanieh
Resident Representative to the IAEA before the Board of Governors 6 March 2013
In the Name of God, the Most Gracious and the Most Merciful
Mr. Chairman, Distinguished Colleagues,
At the outset, at the eve of spring which simultaneously starts with the New Year holiday in Iran and 10 other countries, recognized by the UN as NOWRUZ, I wish all success in fulfilling the expectation of the world public in establishing global peace and security. The first step is to prevent confrontation and to change the gear to dialogue in a civilized manner.
I am obliged to put on record the appreciation for the indispensable sustained support of the Non-Aligned Movement regarding the protection of Iran’s inalienable right for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy during the last decade. The Movement’s struggle for peace and disarmament, for the establishment of justice and by its valuable contributions to the International Organizations have made an unprecedented record, a golden chapter in the history of the Non-Aligned Movement.
We have to learn from nature and change the status and open a new chapter in the IAEA. In order to do so I have to review Iran’s nuclear dossier in order to make a careful diagnosis to find out the reasons for such an endless process, which has kept the file open for a decade. I seek your indulgence to bear with the short time of presentation compared to 10 years!
1- Iran and the IAEA routine safeguards and cooperation was disrupted by an allegation in 2002 of underground activities in buildings in Natanz and Arak;
2- Although immediately after the visit of Agency’s inspector, invited by Iran, it was proved that both buildings are above ground easily visible from kilometers away, but the Agency did not report in a responsible manner thus the public was misled by distorted western news, aiming at opening a new file;
3- Iran rejected the accusation of “Non-compliance” with safeguards obligations since it had not by then, 2003, signed the modified code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangement (commitment to report new sites as soon as it starts rather than 180 days before introducing nuclear material) and the Additional Protocol;
4- During inspections, inspectors took swipe samples in Natanz. Later the Agency informed that the analysis showed uranium particles with low and high enrichment.
Iran declared that it is not the result of enrichment in Iran but due to contaminated used components received from intermediaries.
5- Dr. ElBaradei, then Director General, in his meeting with the president congratulating the achievement in nuclear energy, suggested to Iran to apply modified code 3.1. Iran agreed to do so.
6- The Ministers of foreign affairs of France, United Kingdom and Germany (so called EU3) travelled to Tehran, declared that they are going to play the role of interlocutors, to prevent escalations of the political situation. They asked Iran to suspend enrichment activities for a short period, until the ambiguities on the sources of uranium contamination are removed. They also requested Iran to apply voluntarily the Additional Protocol. Iran did so.
7- Following the proactive cooperation by Iran, in many cases beyond NPT, and intensive and long technical investigation, the Director General declared and reported, in 2004, to the Board of Governors that the source of contamination was from abroad and therefore the assertion of Iran was correct. Therefore, there was no more justification for suspension and the file had to be closed.
8- Immediately after such important news, the United States made an allegation on existence of clandestine nuclear activities, specifically enrichment in Kolahdooz military sites.
9- While Iran was taking proactive cooperation and voluntary steps, including implementation of the Additional Protocol, during the suspension of enrichment activities, surprisingly the EU3, claiming to play the role of moderating and diffusing tension, themselves gave hostile statements and submitted resolutions against Iran in almost each Board of Governors.
10- During robust inspection Agency noticed that the claimed location, specification of which was given by US intelligence service, turned out to be stables of horses. The Agency team apologized to Iran for the inconvenience. Several other accusations on nuclear activities in military sites proved to be baseless and were reported to the Board of Governors. But the scenario of allegations continued.
11- The hidden agenda was realized. Despite all cooperation by Iran, beyond NPT, including suspension of all enrichment activities, implementing the Additional Protocol, and modified code 3.1, for 2.5 years, EU3 and USA submitted a resolution in 2006 to convey the Iran’s nuclear dossier to the United Nations Security Council.
12- The Iranian parliament mandated the Government to contain its cooperation with the Agency within NPT and to suspend voluntary cooperation namely suspension of enrichment, implementation of the Additional Protocol and the modified code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangement.
13- Pursuant to talks between the EU High Representative, the Director General with the Secretary of National Security Council, intensive negotiation by Iran and the Agency was conducted in Tehran. The Work Plan (document INFCIRC/711) for resolution of outstanding issues was agreed upon on 27 August 2007. Iran made a great concession since the measures were beyond NPT obligations.
14- Pursuant to intensive joint work, Dr. Elbaradei, the then Director General reported that all 6 outstanding issues in the exhausted list of the Work Plan were resolved.
15- As regards the alleged studies, Dr. Elbradei honestly reported that the prevention by a certain country, the United States, from delivery of documents on the alleged studies to Iran, has jeopardized the verification activities of the Agency. He further informed that the documents lack authenticity and according to the alleged document no nuclear material or activities were involved. He however requested Iran for a concession to let the Agency show Iran the alleged material by power point presentation since the Agency was not allowed to deliver the documents. Trusting his good will and expecting the closure of the file as soon as possible Iran accepted his request.
16- After about 100-hour discussion in Iran, Iran proved that the material on alleged studies were forged and fabricated. The Agency then requested Iran to present explanations also in writing in order to close the file. Iran did so in 117 pages.
17- The Agency in full contravention with the Work Plan where the Agency had explicitly declared that no more issue or document would be raised, brought forth new allegations, the so called “Possible Military Dimensions (PMD)”. The Agency did also not comply with its commitment by turning the safeguards implementation into routine manner as envisaged in the agreed Work Plan.
18- After a few years, once again Iran did make a historical political decision to take voluntary steps in order to remove ambiguities regarding allegations related to military sites. Due to the nature of allegations, PMD, directly related to national security, being beyond nuclear related routine NPT Safeguard Agreement we had to negotiate with the Agency on a particular unprecedented framework, a modality, the so called Structured Approach, where both sides’ tasks are well defined.
19- It is a matter of great concern that the verification is turned into “Intelligence information driven safeguards” and is based on information from open sources and there is no accountability and compensation if allegations proved baseless. We have to change this dangerous approach which is going to be precedence. One could think of the model envisaged in the CWC where a country has to officially request a challenge inspection against other member states. The requested member state is fully responsible and not the Secretariat.
20- Iran’s main elements of its legitimate expectation during negotiation have been:
A- To end the endless process. One has to see light at the end of the tunnel. After implementation of the new modality on resolution of outstanding issues, the file has to be closed and the Agency’s safeguards have to turn into routine manner.
B- We should not start from scratch. Either the Work Plan (INFCIRC/711) of 2007 is implemented, as Iran strongly believes, then Director General and Board of Governors have to declare it closed and safeguards has to turn into routine manner. If the Agency is of the view that the last part, alleged studies, needs further work, then the new modality has to be the follow up of the Work Plan which was endorsed by the Board of Governors. The DG has so far prevented any reference to it. This is a dilemma.
C- National security of Member States, including Iran’s, has to be considered as top priority. The bitter fact that the confidential information is not protected by the Agency is a matter of serious security concern. No country shall give a blank cheque to the Secretariat for any further unknown action which it requests in the future. The negotiating team was working on a language to deal with this concern paving the way for conclusion of the text in Tehran next day, but they suspended the talk and left to Vienna, despite planning for a second day, after instruction by the DG via phone call.
D- A sovereign member state and the Secretariat are not in equal footing. The concerned state has the right to exercise maximum vigilance in committing itself for actions with possible impact on its national security.
E- Iran granted access two times in 2005 to Parchin military site, where the former Director General reported no evidence of nuclear material or activities was found. Now the DG has reopened the closed issues including the request for access to a building on the same site claimed to be built in 2000, 5 years prior to the last free robust conclusive inspection where the Agency proved allegations baseless and as former DDG said the Parchin was part of history. The fact that Parchin is among the topic in the clean text being negotiated proves Iran’s transparency. If Iran and the Agency had agreed on a modality prior to giving access to Parcin in 2005, the situation now would have been different. Therefore, access to any place has to be made based on a negotiated criteria and modality since such a measure is beyond normal NPT verification. The DG’s repeated public request for access to Parchin before the conclusion and signature of a modality or the so called structured approach is unjustified and has highly politicized the issue thus provoking and creating a huge obstacle.
F- The last but not the least: The remote control from the Agency headquarters and lack of full authority of the negotiation team, headed by the Deputy Director General is one of the main reasons for prolongation of talks and inconclusiveness. Otherwise by now the modality should have been signed and access was granted and outstanding issues were resolved.
Mr. Chairman,
I have to make the following short comments on the DG’s introductory statement as well as his last written report (Gov/2012/55):
The DG stated: “… Iran is not providing the necessary cooperation, including by not implementing its additional protocol, the Agency is unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran…” or “… unless and until Iran provides the necessary cooperation with the Agency, including by implementing its additional protocol”, through which Iran is requested to implement the Additional Protocol.
In this context, I draw the kind attention of my colleagues to the following:
1- The Additional Protocol (AP) is not a legally binding instrument and is voluntary in nature. Hence, many Member States (61 as reported by SIR2011) including Iran not implementing this voluntary protocol are not violating NPT Safeguards obligations.
2- Basically, it is not acceptable that a voluntary instrument be turned into a legal obligation without consent of a sovereign state. This basic concept regarding Additional Protocol has been affirmed in the 2010 NPT Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)) as well as in the Agency’s General Conference (GC (56)/RES/13) which latter’s reads: “it is the sovereign decision of any State to conclude an additional protocol”.
3- Any Member State, including Iran, has the sovereign right to decide not to ratify the Additional Protocol. The statement reflected in paragraph 53 of the report (GOV/2012/55) to the effect that “Iran is not providing necessary cooperation, including by not implementing its Additional Protocol” has no legal basis and is beyond the DG’s statutory mandate. The Agency is merely obliged to verify the compliance of Member States on the basis of the Statute of the IAEA and the relevant Safeguards Agreements.
4- In spite of Iran’s cooperation to implement AP voluntarily for more than 2.5 years (2003-2006) as a confidence-building measure, regrettably in the same period, seven illegal and politically-motivated resolutions were adopted by the Board of Governors (BOG) under the pressure of a few western states, which clearly indicates that the case of the Islamic Republic of Iran is neither technical nor legal, but just politicized.
5- In periodic reports to the BOG on implementation of Safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran, the DG has inserted a new subtitle as “Additional Protocol” assuming that Iran has to implement the Additional Protocol. Based on this wrong assumption, the DG has misled the BOG by asserting false statements in his reports by announcing that “Iran is not providing the necessary cooperation, including by not implementing its additional protocol…”.
6- The misrepresentation of Iran’s commitments in respect to the Additional Protocol or extracting legally-binding obligations from the illegal resolutions of the UNSC, apart from unauthorized interference in the application of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, are all unrealistic and non-binding to the Islamic Republic of Iran; and any action requested by the Board of Governors in this respect would be unconstitutional, politically-motivated and illegal.
7- The footnote 56 of the report (GOV/2012/55) (completeness) reads that “the BOG has confirmed on numerous occasions, since as early as 1992, that paragraph 2 of INFCIRC/153 (Corr.), which corresponds to Article 2 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, authorizes and requires the Agency to seek to verify both the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities (i.e. correctness) and the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in the State (i.e. completeness) (see, for example, GOV/OR.864, Para. 49)”. In this regard, the following points should be noted:
8- The BOG has never authorized or required the Agency to seek to verify both the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities (i.e. correctness) and the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in a Member State. The records of GOV/OR.864 clearly show that this was a personal view and only a sum-up made by the Chairman at that BOG meeting. He reads: “the Board endorses the general direction of Programme 93+2”, followed by reservations expressed by some Board Members, for example: “acceptance of the recommendations made in document GOV/2784 would not imply endorsement of any of the specific measures described in that document or of the legal interpretations advanced by the Secretariat”.
The BOG did not confirm the Chairman’s view asserted in the statement. So this neither means a “unanimous interpretation” nor would it create any “unilateral obligation”. If the unilateral interpretation asserted in footnote 56 was true, there was no need to codify the AP and therefore, the Safeguards Agreements would have been sufficient concerning correctness and completeness.
9- Although the footnote states that “Article 2 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, authorizes and requires the Agency to seek to verify both the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities (i.e. correctness) and the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in the State (i.e. completeness)”, but it fails to transcript Article 2 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement completely as it clearly reiterates on Agency’s “right and the obligation to ensure that safeguards will be applied, in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, on all source or special fissionable material”! Therefore, requiring Iran to implement verification measures outside the purview of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, such as implementing Additional Protocol, is beyond the Agency’s rights and obligations, illegal and non-binding.
10- Basically, any unilateral interpretation of a bilateral agreement, including Safeguards Agreements, which may affect its application, would not be binding before its approval by both parties.
11- The Islamic Republic of Iran has fully cooperated with the Agency in implementation of safeguards measures on its nuclear material and facilities. Therefore, a statement such as “… Iran is not providing the necessary cooperation, including by not implementing its Additional Protocol, the Agency is unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities”, is absolutely wrong, has no legal basis and is another example of lacking impartiality.
12- The fact is that all declared nuclear material in Iran is accounted for and has not been diverted to military purposes, and remained in peaceful activities under the Agency’s full-scope surveillance. Mixing the notions of “declared nuclear material” and “all nuclear material” in the context of the CSA and Additional Protocol, respectively, in a non-professional manner is not legally justified. It is also contrary to the expectation of the Non-Aligned Movement which in its several statements addressed the Board of Governors that “NAM emphasizes the fundamental distinction between the legal obligations of states in accordance with their respective Safeguards Agreements, as opposed to any confidence building measures undertaken voluntarily and that do not constitute a legal safeguards obligation.” Thus, the derived conclusion on aforementioned notion is absolutely wrong and must be corrected accordingly.
In this regard, the Islamic Republic of Iran reserves its rights to claim all damages caused by misinterpretation of DG reports to the BOG.
Mr. Chairman,
Permit me to give some comments on “Lack of Protection of Confidential Information”:
1- Regrettably, confidential information coming to the Agency’s knowledge has been leaking for quite a while. In this respect, on several occasions (through statements in the Board of Governors, correspondence with the Agency) the concerns and objections regarding the leakage of confidential information has been brought to the attention of the Agency, reiterating the fact that the Agency shall maintain a stringent regime to ensure effective protection against disclosure of confidential information.
2- The issue of confidentiality is one of the most important elements in application of Safeguards Agreements between the IAEA and Member States. The Article 5(a) of the Safeguards Agreement between Iran and the Agency (INFCIRC/214) stipulates that: “The Agency shall take every precaution to protect commercial and industrial secrets and other confidential information coming to its knowledge in the implementation of this agreement.”
3- Article 9(c) of the said reference also states: “The visits and activities of the Agency inspectors shall be so arranged as: … (ii) To ensure protection of industrial secrets or any other confidential information coming to the inspectors’ knowledge.”
4- Also article VII(F) of the Agency’s Statute stipulates that:“In the performance of their duties, the Director General and the staff …. Shall not disclose any industrial secret or other confidential information coming to their knowledge by reason of their official duties for the Agency. …”
5- It should be recalled that the concerns expressed about the protection of confidentiality in the resolution on strengthening the safeguards was adopted by the 56th General Conference as well as the 2010 NPT Review Conference.
6- Unfortunately, so far the Agency has not been able to protect the confidential information resulting from the conduct of inspections at the safeguarded facilities in the Islamic Republic of Iran, which occasionally has leaked through the Agency and revealed to the media. The very last one is the information provided to the Agency (23/01/2013) on the installation of new centrifuges (IR2m) in Natanz facility. Such events are profoundly in violation of the above mentioned articles as well as the IAEA Statute. Needless to say that continuation of such trend leads to mistrust between Member States and the IAEA, and also creates negative atmosphere which causes irreparable damages.
Regrettably, this issue became a regular practice and in spite of constant protests by Iran, the Agency has not taken concrete actions on this sensitive issue to prevent its repetition, and thus it has lead to an ongoing trend of violating the confidentiality of information.
Moreover, it is apparently observed that the Agency’s inspectors are being used as verifier of a sabotage influence. Besides the report given by H.E. Dr. Abbasi in the statement at the GC56, after recent false news about an explosion in the Fordow facility was broadcast by some western media, the Agency immediately embarked on an Unannounced Inspection in the Fordow facility, and the day after, the Agency released the result of the inspection and declared that there was no destruction in the facility.
Whatever terrorist states are planning and conducting sabotage against Iran, safeguarded nuclear facilities are being evaluated by the Agency. Consequently, through the reports which are not being kept confidential passes to the terrorist states to modify intelligence services’ covert operations. It should be recalled that the purpose of conducting Unannounced Inspection is to verify non-diversion of nuclear material and not to check the efficiency of covert actions. Definitely, such course of action is strongly wrong and would lead to a highly dangerous end.
On behalf of my Government, I hereby protest the lack of required protection of confidential information. It is necessary that such trend be rectified soon. A mechanism similar to the one envisaged in the Chemical Weapon Convention, a body consists of some member states, as in the OPCW, has to be established in order to investigate breach of confidentiality and a procedure for compensation of damages due to such breaches. In the meantime, the Islamic Republic of Iran reserves its right to claim all damages aroused by such behavior at the proper time.
Mr. Chairman, Distinguished Colleagues,
Under the pretext of Iran’s nuclear issue serious violation of spirit and letter of the NPT by some western countries are totally ignored:
I would like to inform that I have not received any response, after two years to my letter dated 8 March 2011 to the Director General regarding safeguards verification in European countries hosting nuclear weapons, in accordance with their obligation under NPT. The DG is expected to inform all Member States whether the Agency has received declaration of the exact locations and amounts of weapon-grade nuclear material in those non-nuclear weapon states, and whether the Agency has verified such declarations.
The United States Government has, for a long time, transferred hundreds of nuclear weapons to certain non-nuclear-weapon states party to NPT, including those under the umbrella of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It is estimated that about 240 nuclear warheads are located in several European countries comprising Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, and Italy under the NATO nuclear umbrella system. Evidence of similar violations has been brought forward in the NPT Review Conferences.
Deploying hundreds of nuclear weapons in non-nuclear-weapon states and training the fighter/bomber pilots of the host states to prepare for handling and delivering the US nuclear bombs against nuclear as well as non-nuclear-weapon states contravene both the letter and spirit of the NPT, in particular its articles I and II and the comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/153) with the Agency.
The Statute of the IAEA also stipulates that the Agency should conduct its activities towards “furthering the establishment of safeguarded worldwide disarmament”. The 2010 NPT Review Conference, albeit insufficiently, adopted certain actions in this regard. For instance in Action 5, the Conference resolved that: “the nuclear-weapon States commit to accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament and to that end, they are called upon to promptly address the question of nuclear weapons regardless of their type or their location as an integral part of the general nuclear disarmament process.”
Furthermore, the nuclear-weapon states committed themselves to declare to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) all fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes and to place such material as soon as practicable under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes. The Conference also called for wider application of safeguards to peaceful nuclear facilities in the nuclear-weapon states.
This is a matter of serious concern threatening the global security and the non-proliferation regime including the NPT. The Islamic Republic of Iran as a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT and a Member State of the IAEA, cannot accept the status quo regarding the development of nuclear weapons in Europe, which is not only a clear violation of the letter and spirit of the NPT by both United States and the European countries hosting nuclear weapons, but also they pose serious threat to global security.
On the other hand, the silence of Board of Governors vis-à-vis the nuclear weapons activities and violation of international law including resolutions of IAEA Board of Governors by the Zionist regime of Israel which is a serious threat to peace and security of the Middle East and world at large has posed questions and doubt on the responsible conduct of this body entrusted by the Statute. It is high time to bring about a serious reform in the Board of Governors structure, composition and mandate.
Mr. Chairman, Distinguished Delegates,
In conclusion, I have to reiterate that nuclear weapons have no place in the defense doctrine of Iran, since the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran publicly announced the FATWA, the decree considering nuclear weapons religiously forbidden. Iran shall not accept a bit more than its obligation under the NPT – Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and not a bit less than its in-alienable right for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including enrichment for peaceful purposes.
The Islamic Republic of Iran has spared no effort in removing the ambiguities during last 10 years. The Agency has repeatedly reported that it has found no evidence of diversion of nuclear material or activities to military purpose, no smoking gun. Continuous allegations, all proved baseless, have kept the dossier open. This endless process has to be stopped.
The policy of sanction-dialogue, threat of military attacks against nuclear facilities, and state terrorist actions against nuclear scientists all have proved to be counterproductive. They have increased the solidarity and determination of the Great Nation of Iran to pursue its legitimate right for nuclear energy, specifically enrichment. The reports of the DG on continuous advancement of nuclear technology in Iran prove my assertion.
Mr. Chairman,
Depolarization and depolarization of the Agency, disengagement of the UN Security Council in this technical issue belonging to the IAEA along with dialogue are the only civilized ways in removing ambiguities, if any.
Finally I declare that the Islamic Republic of Iran is the most reliable stable strategic country in the region with great potential for resolving regional and global problems. It was evident that the policy of talk and pressure is doomed to failure. I therefore invite those few countries with hostile attitudes and conduct during past decades to change the gear from confrontation mode to the negotiating one for the purpose of cooperation. The window of opportunity is still open.
Thank you.
The press conference of Ambassador Soltanieh was held after a hot argument behind closed doors inside the IAEA Board of Governors meeting.
The speech of the Iranian representative is published in full below.
Statement by H.E. Ambassador Ali Asghar Soltanieh
Resident Representative to the IAEA before the Board of Governors 6 March 2013
In the Name of God, the Most Gracious and the Most Merciful
Mr. Chairman, Distinguished Colleagues,
At the outset, at the eve of spring which simultaneously starts with the New Year holiday in Iran and 10 other countries, recognized by the UN as NOWRUZ, I wish all success in fulfilling the expectation of the world public in establishing global peace and security. The first step is to prevent confrontation and to change the gear to dialogue in a civilized manner.
I am obliged to put on record the appreciation for the indispensable sustained support of the Non-Aligned Movement regarding the protection of Iran’s inalienable right for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy during the last decade. The Movement’s struggle for peace and disarmament, for the establishment of justice and by its valuable contributions to the International Organizations have made an unprecedented record, a golden chapter in the history of the Non-Aligned Movement.
We have to learn from nature and change the status and open a new chapter in the IAEA. In order to do so I have to review Iran’s nuclear dossier in order to make a careful diagnosis to find out the reasons for such an endless process, which has kept the file open for a decade. I seek your indulgence to bear with the short time of presentation compared to 10 years!
1- Iran and the IAEA routine safeguards and cooperation was disrupted by an allegation in 2002 of underground activities in buildings in Natanz and Arak;
2- Although immediately after the visit of Agency’s inspector, invited by Iran, it was proved that both buildings are above ground easily visible from kilometers away, but the Agency did not report in a responsible manner thus the public was misled by distorted western news, aiming at opening a new file;
3- Iran rejected the accusation of “Non-compliance” with safeguards obligations since it had not by then, 2003, signed the modified code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangement (commitment to report new sites as soon as it starts rather than 180 days before introducing nuclear material) and the Additional Protocol;
4- During inspections, inspectors took swipe samples in Natanz. Later the Agency informed that the analysis showed uranium particles with low and high enrichment.
Iran declared that it is not the result of enrichment in Iran but due to contaminated used components received from intermediaries.
5- Dr. ElBaradei, then Director General, in his meeting with the president congratulating the achievement in nuclear energy, suggested to Iran to apply modified code 3.1. Iran agreed to do so.
6- The Ministers of foreign affairs of France, United Kingdom and Germany (so called EU3) travelled to Tehran, declared that they are going to play the role of interlocutors, to prevent escalations of the political situation. They asked Iran to suspend enrichment activities for a short period, until the ambiguities on the sources of uranium contamination are removed. They also requested Iran to apply voluntarily the Additional Protocol. Iran did so.
7- Following the proactive cooperation by Iran, in many cases beyond NPT, and intensive and long technical investigation, the Director General declared and reported, in 2004, to the Board of Governors that the source of contamination was from abroad and therefore the assertion of Iran was correct. Therefore, there was no more justification for suspension and the file had to be closed.
8- Immediately after such important news, the United States made an allegation on existence of clandestine nuclear activities, specifically enrichment in Kolahdooz military sites.
9- While Iran was taking proactive cooperation and voluntary steps, including implementation of the Additional Protocol, during the suspension of enrichment activities, surprisingly the EU3, claiming to play the role of moderating and diffusing tension, themselves gave hostile statements and submitted resolutions against Iran in almost each Board of Governors.
10- During robust inspection Agency noticed that the claimed location, specification of which was given by US intelligence service, turned out to be stables of horses. The Agency team apologized to Iran for the inconvenience. Several other accusations on nuclear activities in military sites proved to be baseless and were reported to the Board of Governors. But the scenario of allegations continued.
11- The hidden agenda was realized. Despite all cooperation by Iran, beyond NPT, including suspension of all enrichment activities, implementing the Additional Protocol, and modified code 3.1, for 2.5 years, EU3 and USA submitted a resolution in 2006 to convey the Iran’s nuclear dossier to the United Nations Security Council.
12- The Iranian parliament mandated the Government to contain its cooperation with the Agency within NPT and to suspend voluntary cooperation namely suspension of enrichment, implementation of the Additional Protocol and the modified code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangement.
13- Pursuant to talks between the EU High Representative, the Director General with the Secretary of National Security Council, intensive negotiation by Iran and the Agency was conducted in Tehran. The Work Plan (document INFCIRC/711) for resolution of outstanding issues was agreed upon on 27 August 2007. Iran made a great concession since the measures were beyond NPT obligations.
14- Pursuant to intensive joint work, Dr. Elbaradei, the then Director General reported that all 6 outstanding issues in the exhausted list of the Work Plan were resolved.
15- As regards the alleged studies, Dr. Elbradei honestly reported that the prevention by a certain country, the United States, from delivery of documents on the alleged studies to Iran, has jeopardized the verification activities of the Agency. He further informed that the documents lack authenticity and according to the alleged document no nuclear material or activities were involved. He however requested Iran for a concession to let the Agency show Iran the alleged material by power point presentation since the Agency was not allowed to deliver the documents. Trusting his good will and expecting the closure of the file as soon as possible Iran accepted his request.
16- After about 100-hour discussion in Iran, Iran proved that the material on alleged studies were forged and fabricated. The Agency then requested Iran to present explanations also in writing in order to close the file. Iran did so in 117 pages.
17- The Agency in full contravention with the Work Plan where the Agency had explicitly declared that no more issue or document would be raised, brought forth new allegations, the so called “Possible Military Dimensions (PMD)”. The Agency did also not comply with its commitment by turning the safeguards implementation into routine manner as envisaged in the agreed Work Plan.
18- After a few years, once again Iran did make a historical political decision to take voluntary steps in order to remove ambiguities regarding allegations related to military sites. Due to the nature of allegations, PMD, directly related to national security, being beyond nuclear related routine NPT Safeguard Agreement we had to negotiate with the Agency on a particular unprecedented framework, a modality, the so called Structured Approach, where both sides’ tasks are well defined.
19- It is a matter of great concern that the verification is turned into “Intelligence information driven safeguards” and is based on information from open sources and there is no accountability and compensation if allegations proved baseless. We have to change this dangerous approach which is going to be precedence. One could think of the model envisaged in the CWC where a country has to officially request a challenge inspection against other member states. The requested member state is fully responsible and not the Secretariat.
20- Iran’s main elements of its legitimate expectation during negotiation have been:
A- To end the endless process. One has to see light at the end of the tunnel. After implementation of the new modality on resolution of outstanding issues, the file has to be closed and the Agency’s safeguards have to turn into routine manner.
B- We should not start from scratch. Either the Work Plan (INFCIRC/711) of 2007 is implemented, as Iran strongly believes, then Director General and Board of Governors have to declare it closed and safeguards has to turn into routine manner. If the Agency is of the view that the last part, alleged studies, needs further work, then the new modality has to be the follow up of the Work Plan which was endorsed by the Board of Governors. The DG has so far prevented any reference to it. This is a dilemma.
C- National security of Member States, including Iran’s, has to be considered as top priority. The bitter fact that the confidential information is not protected by the Agency is a matter of serious security concern. No country shall give a blank cheque to the Secretariat for any further unknown action which it requests in the future. The negotiating team was working on a language to deal with this concern paving the way for conclusion of the text in Tehran next day, but they suspended the talk and left to Vienna, despite planning for a second day, after instruction by the DG via phone call.
D- A sovereign member state and the Secretariat are not in equal footing. The concerned state has the right to exercise maximum vigilance in committing itself for actions with possible impact on its national security.
E- Iran granted access two times in 2005 to Parchin military site, where the former Director General reported no evidence of nuclear material or activities was found. Now the DG has reopened the closed issues including the request for access to a building on the same site claimed to be built in 2000, 5 years prior to the last free robust conclusive inspection where the Agency proved allegations baseless and as former DDG said the Parchin was part of history. The fact that Parchin is among the topic in the clean text being negotiated proves Iran’s transparency. If Iran and the Agency had agreed on a modality prior to giving access to Parcin in 2005, the situation now would have been different. Therefore, access to any place has to be made based on a negotiated criteria and modality since such a measure is beyond normal NPT verification. The DG’s repeated public request for access to Parchin before the conclusion and signature of a modality or the so called structured approach is unjustified and has highly politicized the issue thus provoking and creating a huge obstacle.
F- The last but not the least: The remote control from the Agency headquarters and lack of full authority of the negotiation team, headed by the Deputy Director General is one of the main reasons for prolongation of talks and inconclusiveness. Otherwise by now the modality should have been signed and access was granted and outstanding issues were resolved.
Mr. Chairman,
I have to make the following short comments on the DG’s introductory statement as well as his last written report (Gov/2012/55):
The DG stated: “… Iran is not providing the necessary cooperation, including by not implementing its additional protocol, the Agency is unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran…” or “… unless and until Iran provides the necessary cooperation with the Agency, including by implementing its additional protocol”, through which Iran is requested to implement the Additional Protocol.
In this context, I draw the kind attention of my colleagues to the following:
1- The Additional Protocol (AP) is not a legally binding instrument and is voluntary in nature. Hence, many Member States (61 as reported by SIR2011) including Iran not implementing this voluntary protocol are not violating NPT Safeguards obligations.
2- Basically, it is not acceptable that a voluntary instrument be turned into a legal obligation without consent of a sovereign state. This basic concept regarding Additional Protocol has been affirmed in the 2010 NPT Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)) as well as in the Agency’s General Conference (GC (56)/RES/13) which latter’s reads: “it is the sovereign decision of any State to conclude an additional protocol”.
3- Any Member State, including Iran, has the sovereign right to decide not to ratify the Additional Protocol. The statement reflected in paragraph 53 of the report (GOV/2012/55) to the effect that “Iran is not providing necessary cooperation, including by not implementing its Additional Protocol” has no legal basis and is beyond the DG’s statutory mandate. The Agency is merely obliged to verify the compliance of Member States on the basis of the Statute of the IAEA and the relevant Safeguards Agreements.
4- In spite of Iran’s cooperation to implement AP voluntarily for more than 2.5 years (2003-2006) as a confidence-building measure, regrettably in the same period, seven illegal and politically-motivated resolutions were adopted by the Board of Governors (BOG) under the pressure of a few western states, which clearly indicates that the case of the Islamic Republic of Iran is neither technical nor legal, but just politicized.
5- In periodic reports to the BOG on implementation of Safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran, the DG has inserted a new subtitle as “Additional Protocol” assuming that Iran has to implement the Additional Protocol. Based on this wrong assumption, the DG has misled the BOG by asserting false statements in his reports by announcing that “Iran is not providing the necessary cooperation, including by not implementing its additional protocol…”.
6- The misrepresentation of Iran’s commitments in respect to the Additional Protocol or extracting legally-binding obligations from the illegal resolutions of the UNSC, apart from unauthorized interference in the application of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, are all unrealistic and non-binding to the Islamic Republic of Iran; and any action requested by the Board of Governors in this respect would be unconstitutional, politically-motivated and illegal.
7- The footnote 56 of the report (GOV/2012/55) (completeness) reads that “the BOG has confirmed on numerous occasions, since as early as 1992, that paragraph 2 of INFCIRC/153 (Corr.), which corresponds to Article 2 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, authorizes and requires the Agency to seek to verify both the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities (i.e. correctness) and the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in the State (i.e. completeness) (see, for example, GOV/OR.864, Para. 49)”. In this regard, the following points should be noted:
8- The BOG has never authorized or required the Agency to seek to verify both the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities (i.e. correctness) and the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in a Member State. The records of GOV/OR.864 clearly show that this was a personal view and only a sum-up made by the Chairman at that BOG meeting. He reads: “the Board endorses the general direction of Programme 93+2”, followed by reservations expressed by some Board Members, for example: “acceptance of the recommendations made in document GOV/2784 would not imply endorsement of any of the specific measures described in that document or of the legal interpretations advanced by the Secretariat”.
The BOG did not confirm the Chairman’s view asserted in the statement. So this neither means a “unanimous interpretation” nor would it create any “unilateral obligation”. If the unilateral interpretation asserted in footnote 56 was true, there was no need to codify the AP and therefore, the Safeguards Agreements would have been sufficient concerning correctness and completeness.
9- Although the footnote states that “Article 2 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, authorizes and requires the Agency to seek to verify both the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities (i.e. correctness) and the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in the State (i.e. completeness)”, but it fails to transcript Article 2 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement completely as it clearly reiterates on Agency’s “right and the obligation to ensure that safeguards will be applied, in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, on all source or special fissionable material”! Therefore, requiring Iran to implement verification measures outside the purview of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, such as implementing Additional Protocol, is beyond the Agency’s rights and obligations, illegal and non-binding.
10- Basically, any unilateral interpretation of a bilateral agreement, including Safeguards Agreements, which may affect its application, would not be binding before its approval by both parties.
11- The Islamic Republic of Iran has fully cooperated with the Agency in implementation of safeguards measures on its nuclear material and facilities. Therefore, a statement such as “… Iran is not providing the necessary cooperation, including by not implementing its Additional Protocol, the Agency is unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities”, is absolutely wrong, has no legal basis and is another example of lacking impartiality.
12- The fact is that all declared nuclear material in Iran is accounted for and has not been diverted to military purposes, and remained in peaceful activities under the Agency’s full-scope surveillance. Mixing the notions of “declared nuclear material” and “all nuclear material” in the context of the CSA and Additional Protocol, respectively, in a non-professional manner is not legally justified. It is also contrary to the expectation of the Non-Aligned Movement which in its several statements addressed the Board of Governors that “NAM emphasizes the fundamental distinction between the legal obligations of states in accordance with their respective Safeguards Agreements, as opposed to any confidence building measures undertaken voluntarily and that do not constitute a legal safeguards obligation.” Thus, the derived conclusion on aforementioned notion is absolutely wrong and must be corrected accordingly.
In this regard, the Islamic Republic of Iran reserves its rights to claim all damages caused by misinterpretation of DG reports to the BOG.
Mr. Chairman,
Permit me to give some comments on “Lack of Protection of Confidential Information”:
1- Regrettably, confidential information coming to the Agency’s knowledge has been leaking for quite a while. In this respect, on several occasions (through statements in the Board of Governors, correspondence with the Agency) the concerns and objections regarding the leakage of confidential information has been brought to the attention of the Agency, reiterating the fact that the Agency shall maintain a stringent regime to ensure effective protection against disclosure of confidential information.
2- The issue of confidentiality is one of the most important elements in application of Safeguards Agreements between the IAEA and Member States. The Article 5(a) of the Safeguards Agreement between Iran and the Agency (INFCIRC/214) stipulates that: “The Agency shall take every precaution to protect commercial and industrial secrets and other confidential information coming to its knowledge in the implementation of this agreement.”
3- Article 9(c) of the said reference also states: “The visits and activities of the Agency inspectors shall be so arranged as: … (ii) To ensure protection of industrial secrets or any other confidential information coming to the inspectors’ knowledge.”
4- Also article VII(F) of the Agency’s Statute stipulates that:“In the performance of their duties, the Director General and the staff …. Shall not disclose any industrial secret or other confidential information coming to their knowledge by reason of their official duties for the Agency. …”
5- It should be recalled that the concerns expressed about the protection of confidentiality in the resolution on strengthening the safeguards was adopted by the 56th General Conference as well as the 2010 NPT Review Conference.
6- Unfortunately, so far the Agency has not been able to protect the confidential information resulting from the conduct of inspections at the safeguarded facilities in the Islamic Republic of Iran, which occasionally has leaked through the Agency and revealed to the media. The very last one is the information provided to the Agency (23/01/2013) on the installation of new centrifuges (IR2m) in Natanz facility. Such events are profoundly in violation of the above mentioned articles as well as the IAEA Statute. Needless to say that continuation of such trend leads to mistrust between Member States and the IAEA, and also creates negative atmosphere which causes irreparable damages.
Regrettably, this issue became a regular practice and in spite of constant protests by Iran, the Agency has not taken concrete actions on this sensitive issue to prevent its repetition, and thus it has lead to an ongoing trend of violating the confidentiality of information.
Moreover, it is apparently observed that the Agency’s inspectors are being used as verifier of a sabotage influence. Besides the report given by H.E. Dr. Abbasi in the statement at the GC56, after recent false news about an explosion in the Fordow facility was broadcast by some western media, the Agency immediately embarked on an Unannounced Inspection in the Fordow facility, and the day after, the Agency released the result of the inspection and declared that there was no destruction in the facility.
Whatever terrorist states are planning and conducting sabotage against Iran, safeguarded nuclear facilities are being evaluated by the Agency. Consequently, through the reports which are not being kept confidential passes to the terrorist states to modify intelligence services’ covert operations. It should be recalled that the purpose of conducting Unannounced Inspection is to verify non-diversion of nuclear material and not to check the efficiency of covert actions. Definitely, such course of action is strongly wrong and would lead to a highly dangerous end.
On behalf of my Government, I hereby protest the lack of required protection of confidential information. It is necessary that such trend be rectified soon. A mechanism similar to the one envisaged in the Chemical Weapon Convention, a body consists of some member states, as in the OPCW, has to be established in order to investigate breach of confidentiality and a procedure for compensation of damages due to such breaches. In the meantime, the Islamic Republic of Iran reserves its right to claim all damages aroused by such behavior at the proper time.
Mr. Chairman, Distinguished Colleagues,
Under the pretext of Iran’s nuclear issue serious violation of spirit and letter of the NPT by some western countries are totally ignored:
I would like to inform that I have not received any response, after two years to my letter dated 8 March 2011 to the Director General regarding safeguards verification in European countries hosting nuclear weapons, in accordance with their obligation under NPT. The DG is expected to inform all Member States whether the Agency has received declaration of the exact locations and amounts of weapon-grade nuclear material in those non-nuclear weapon states, and whether the Agency has verified such declarations.
The United States Government has, for a long time, transferred hundreds of nuclear weapons to certain non-nuclear-weapon states party to NPT, including those under the umbrella of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It is estimated that about 240 nuclear warheads are located in several European countries comprising Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, and Italy under the NATO nuclear umbrella system. Evidence of similar violations has been brought forward in the NPT Review Conferences.
Deploying hundreds of nuclear weapons in non-nuclear-weapon states and training the fighter/bomber pilots of the host states to prepare for handling and delivering the US nuclear bombs against nuclear as well as non-nuclear-weapon states contravene both the letter and spirit of the NPT, in particular its articles I and II and the comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/153) with the Agency.
The Statute of the IAEA also stipulates that the Agency should conduct its activities towards “furthering the establishment of safeguarded worldwide disarmament”. The 2010 NPT Review Conference, albeit insufficiently, adopted certain actions in this regard. For instance in Action 5, the Conference resolved that: “the nuclear-weapon States commit to accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament and to that end, they are called upon to promptly address the question of nuclear weapons regardless of their type or their location as an integral part of the general nuclear disarmament process.”
Furthermore, the nuclear-weapon states committed themselves to declare to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) all fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes and to place such material as soon as practicable under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes. The Conference also called for wider application of safeguards to peaceful nuclear facilities in the nuclear-weapon states.
This is a matter of serious concern threatening the global security and the non-proliferation regime including the NPT. The Islamic Republic of Iran as a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT and a Member State of the IAEA, cannot accept the status quo regarding the development of nuclear weapons in Europe, which is not only a clear violation of the letter and spirit of the NPT by both United States and the European countries hosting nuclear weapons, but also they pose serious threat to global security.
On the other hand, the silence of Board of Governors vis-à-vis the nuclear weapons activities and violation of international law including resolutions of IAEA Board of Governors by the Zionist regime of Israel which is a serious threat to peace and security of the Middle East and world at large has posed questions and doubt on the responsible conduct of this body entrusted by the Statute. It is high time to bring about a serious reform in the Board of Governors structure, composition and mandate.
Mr. Chairman, Distinguished Delegates,
In conclusion, I have to reiterate that nuclear weapons have no place in the defense doctrine of Iran, since the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran publicly announced the FATWA, the decree considering nuclear weapons religiously forbidden. Iran shall not accept a bit more than its obligation under the NPT – Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and not a bit less than its in-alienable right for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including enrichment for peaceful purposes.
The Islamic Republic of Iran has spared no effort in removing the ambiguities during last 10 years. The Agency has repeatedly reported that it has found no evidence of diversion of nuclear material or activities to military purpose, no smoking gun. Continuous allegations, all proved baseless, have kept the dossier open. This endless process has to be stopped.
The policy of sanction-dialogue, threat of military attacks against nuclear facilities, and state terrorist actions against nuclear scientists all have proved to be counterproductive. They have increased the solidarity and determination of the Great Nation of Iran to pursue its legitimate right for nuclear energy, specifically enrichment. The reports of the DG on continuous advancement of nuclear technology in Iran prove my assertion.
Mr. Chairman,
Depolarization and depolarization of the Agency, disengagement of the UN Security Council in this technical issue belonging to the IAEA along with dialogue are the only civilized ways in removing ambiguities, if any.
Finally I declare that the Islamic Republic of Iran is the most reliable stable strategic country in the region with great potential for resolving regional and global problems. It was evident that the policy of talk and pressure is doomed to failure. I therefore invite those few countries with hostile attitudes and conduct during past decades to change the gear from confrontation mode to the negotiating one for the purpose of cooperation. The window of opportunity is still open.
Thank you.
2 mar 2012
Germany fleeces Persian Gulf states to protect Israel: Vahidi
Iran defense minister says the justification given by his German counterpart, Thomas de Maiziere, for selling arms to the Arab states in the Persian Gulf is Berlin’s confession to the pillage of the regional states for protecting Israel.
“Such remarks reveal the evil and treacherous intentions of the West against the regional nations and show that the annual sales of billions of dollars of arms [to the Arab states] by the US, Britain, Germany and France is only aimed to defend the interests of the West and the Zionist regime [of Israel], not to defend regional people,” Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi said on Saturday.
Vahidi's remarks came in response to Germany’s Defense Minister Thomas de Maiziere's statement on Wednesday who said that Berlin’s arms sales to the Arab states of the Persian Gulf region are aimed at protecting Israel.
De Maiziere added that defending Israel against Iran is more important than the human rights situation in Saudi Arabia.
Germany has been strongly criticized for the dramatic increase in arms sales to Arab states like Saudi Arabia, despite their poor human rights record.
The Iranian defense minister also noted that Maiziere’s remarks show that the West views human rights as a tool to advance its anti-human purposes, with no other values.
According to a report published by the Munich-based Suddeutsche Zeitung newspaper on February 22, Germany's weapons exports to the Arab states in the Persian Gulf reached 1.42 billion euros (USD1.88 billion) in 2012.
The report added that Saudi Arabia was the biggest buyer of arms among the Persian Gulf states including Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.
“Such remarks reveal the evil and treacherous intentions of the West against the regional nations and show that the annual sales of billions of dollars of arms [to the Arab states] by the US, Britain, Germany and France is only aimed to defend the interests of the West and the Zionist regime [of Israel], not to defend regional people,” Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi said on Saturday.
Vahidi's remarks came in response to Germany’s Defense Minister Thomas de Maiziere's statement on Wednesday who said that Berlin’s arms sales to the Arab states of the Persian Gulf region are aimed at protecting Israel.
De Maiziere added that defending Israel against Iran is more important than the human rights situation in Saudi Arabia.
Germany has been strongly criticized for the dramatic increase in arms sales to Arab states like Saudi Arabia, despite their poor human rights record.
The Iranian defense minister also noted that Maiziere’s remarks show that the West views human rights as a tool to advance its anti-human purposes, with no other values.
According to a report published by the Munich-based Suddeutsche Zeitung newspaper on February 22, Germany's weapons exports to the Arab states in the Persian Gulf reached 1.42 billion euros (USD1.88 billion) in 2012.
The report added that Saudi Arabia was the biggest buyer of arms among the Persian Gulf states including Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.
11 feb 2013
Obama to Negotiate with Netanyahu on Iran and Palestine
The US President Barack Obama is expected to discuss Iran’s attempts to gain nuclear weapons, the ongoing crisis in Syria, and the stalled peace process between Israelis and Palestinians during his upcoming visit to the region.
The White House wants to keep expectations for broad accomplishments low, especially when it comes to the possibility of reviving the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.
Spokesman Jay Carney has stated that the goal of this visit is not to restart discussions over specific proposals, which have been stalled for the past two years.
The New York Times quoted the possibility of a “mini-summit” with Obama, Netanyahu and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas during Obama’s visit.
According to Palestinian official news source WAFA, Obama will suggest to Israeli Premier Benjamin Netanyahu an intensifying of pressures on Iran in exchange for negotiations with Palestinians, said Israeli daily newspaper, Maarif, on Sunday, 10 February.
The Israeli paper that reported from the British daily, The Sunday Times, said Obama will arrive with “a carrot and a stick” policy in an attempt to persuade Israelis to negotiate with Palestinians regarding borders and security issues.
According to WAFA, The Sunday Times quoted Aaron David Miller, a U.S. State Department adviser on Middle East affairs, saying “Barack Obama does not want to be the American president on whose watch Iran acquires a nuclear weapon or be accused of presiding over the demise of what’s left of the two-state solution.”
Israeli newspaper Ynet also reported that the main objective of President Obama’s visit is for the US to convey the message that Israel should not attack Iran militarily in the coming months. Instead, the US will attempt to convince Israel to continue with diplomatic and peaceful attempts at stopping Iran from gaining nuclear weapons.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has stated that Iran has likely resumed the process of converting uranium into nuclear fuel. The IAEA will produce a full report on these developments at the end of the month.
The White House wants to keep expectations for broad accomplishments low, especially when it comes to the possibility of reviving the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.
Spokesman Jay Carney has stated that the goal of this visit is not to restart discussions over specific proposals, which have been stalled for the past two years.
The New York Times quoted the possibility of a “mini-summit” with Obama, Netanyahu and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas during Obama’s visit.
According to Palestinian official news source WAFA, Obama will suggest to Israeli Premier Benjamin Netanyahu an intensifying of pressures on Iran in exchange for negotiations with Palestinians, said Israeli daily newspaper, Maarif, on Sunday, 10 February.
The Israeli paper that reported from the British daily, The Sunday Times, said Obama will arrive with “a carrot and a stick” policy in an attempt to persuade Israelis to negotiate with Palestinians regarding borders and security issues.
According to WAFA, The Sunday Times quoted Aaron David Miller, a U.S. State Department adviser on Middle East affairs, saying “Barack Obama does not want to be the American president on whose watch Iran acquires a nuclear weapon or be accused of presiding over the demise of what’s left of the two-state solution.”
Israeli newspaper Ynet also reported that the main objective of President Obama’s visit is for the US to convey the message that Israel should not attack Iran militarily in the coming months. Instead, the US will attempt to convince Israel to continue with diplomatic and peaceful attempts at stopping Iran from gaining nuclear weapons.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has stated that Iran has likely resumed the process of converting uranium into nuclear fuel. The IAEA will produce a full report on these developments at the end of the month.
3 feb 2013
Netanyahu: “Government Priorities; Iranian File And Negotiations”
In a Televised speech he delivered, Saturday evening, after being officially tasked with forming the new Israeli government, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, stated that his coming government will have two main priorities; preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, and negotiating Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazin).
On Saturday evening, Israeli President, Shimon Peres, officially asked Netanyahu to form a new government following Netanyahu’s victory in the latest election.
In his speech, Netanyahu called on Abu Mazin to return to the negotiation table, and claimed that his government “is committed to reaching a settlement to the conflict”.
He said that his government will be actively involved in what he called “the international efforts aimed at preventing Tehran from becoming a nuclear power”.
He also vowed to act on creating new employment opportunities, and to act on guaranteeing economic growth in the country.
Netanyahu added that “Israel is facing serious challenges, internally and externally”, and called on all Israeli political parties to join his government coalition.
As for the Palestinian file, Netanyahu said that he wants to hold negotiations with Abu Mazin, and urged him to return to the negotiation table “without preconditions”.
Israeli-Palestinian peace talks have been stalled since 2010 after a 9-month freeze on settlement construction and expansion activities ended, and Israel resumed the construction in the occupied territories on a large scale.
The Palestinians said that Israel must stop all of its settlement activities, and must end its violations and invasions in occupied Palestine before peace talks can be resumed.
Israel said claims that the Palestinian demands are “preconditions”, and the Netanyahu government explicitly said it will build and expand Jewish settlements in the occupied West Bank, including in occupied East Jerusalem.
Settlements violate International Law and the Fourth Geneva convention, to which Israel is a signatory.
On Saturday evening, Israeli President, Shimon Peres, officially asked Netanyahu to form a new government following Netanyahu’s victory in the latest election.
In his speech, Netanyahu called on Abu Mazin to return to the negotiation table, and claimed that his government “is committed to reaching a settlement to the conflict”.
He said that his government will be actively involved in what he called “the international efforts aimed at preventing Tehran from becoming a nuclear power”.
He also vowed to act on creating new employment opportunities, and to act on guaranteeing economic growth in the country.
Netanyahu added that “Israel is facing serious challenges, internally and externally”, and called on all Israeli political parties to join his government coalition.
As for the Palestinian file, Netanyahu said that he wants to hold negotiations with Abu Mazin, and urged him to return to the negotiation table “without preconditions”.
Israeli-Palestinian peace talks have been stalled since 2010 after a 9-month freeze on settlement construction and expansion activities ended, and Israel resumed the construction in the occupied territories on a large scale.
The Palestinians said that Israel must stop all of its settlement activities, and must end its violations and invasions in occupied Palestine before peace talks can be resumed.
Israel said claims that the Palestinian demands are “preconditions”, and the Netanyahu government explicitly said it will build and expand Jewish settlements in the occupied West Bank, including in occupied East Jerusalem.
Settlements violate International Law and the Fourth Geneva convention, to which Israel is a signatory.
31 jan 2013
|
Zionist system controls news channels: IRIB VP
Following a new round of attacks against the Iranian media, the Vice President of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), Dr. Mohammad Sarafraz, says the Zionist system controls all the mainstream news channels in the world. "Because they [the Zionist system] want to proceed with their own economic agendas, they have to control people's thoughts and they achieved this by controlling the largest news channels throughout the world," Sarafraz said during a ceremony to mark the first anniversary of Iran's Spanish-language news channel, Hispan TV, in Tehran on Wednesday. "If a news channel comes and it is an alternative news channel, then the Zionist system wants it removed," he added. The event comes after the Spanish government ordered Madrid's regional government to stop Hispan TV's broadcast as of January 21 in another blow to freedom of speech. |
Hispan TV, along with Iran's 24-hour English-language news channel, Press TV, have been already targeted by Hispasat's fellow European satellite providers Eutelsat and Hotbird.
Hispasat is partly owned by Eutelsat, whose French-Israeli CEO is blamed for the recent wave of attacks on Iranian media in Europe. The IRIB vice president denounced the move as a violation of freedom of speech and said, "The US talks about being the biggest advocate of human rights, free speech and democracy, yet it supported dictators and kings of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain." "It is worried about losing power in the Middle East especially since many of its allies such as [ousted] Egypt's Hosni Mubarak and Tunisia's dictator bin Ali and others have been removed from power," Sarafraz pointed out.
Hispasat is partly owned by Eutelsat, whose French-Israeli CEO is blamed for the recent wave of attacks on Iranian media in Europe. The IRIB vice president denounced the move as a violation of freedom of speech and said, "The US talks about being the biggest advocate of human rights, free speech and democracy, yet it supported dictators and kings of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain." "It is worried about losing power in the Middle East especially since many of its allies such as [ousted] Egypt's Hosni Mubarak and Tunisia's dictator bin Ali and others have been removed from power," Sarafraz pointed out.
Diplomat: Iran says plans to upgrade uranium enrichment at Natanz
Iran has informed the UN nuclear agency that it plans to use more modern uranium enrichment centrifuges at its Natanz plant, a diplomat said on Thursday.
Such a step could enable Iran to refine uranium faster than it can at the moment and increase concerns in the West and Israel about the goals of Tehran nuclear program.
Western powers suspect Iran of seeking to develop atomic bombs, a charge Iran denies.
Such a step could enable Iran to refine uranium faster than it can at the moment and increase concerns in the West and Israel about the goals of Tehran nuclear program.
Western powers suspect Iran of seeking to develop atomic bombs, a charge Iran denies.
30 jan 2013
|
'US leads smear campaign against Iran'
A political analyst says that Israel continually puts out false information in order to create a false scenario of fear, doubt and uncertainty and continue the propaganda against the Iranian government and Iran's nuclear initiatives. The comments came after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) dismissed Israeli and Western media reports claiming there had been an explosion at the Fordow uranium enrichment facility and stated that it had seen no sign of such an event at the Iranian nuclear site. interview with Scott Rickard. |
Page: 2 - 1