|
“Palestinians only sing the chorus as they have no verses (houses) left”The air Force knows how to take down one house that’s inside a neighborhood, but that doesn’t mean all the houses around it don’t get damaged. It’s not like the houses in the [Gaza] Strip are all new and protected with bomb shelters. In the end, these houses get damaged again and again and again, until they collapsecontinue reading ›
categories: Rules of engagement93 views ›//0 comments ›rank: Major
unit: Infantry
area: Northern Gaza strip
period: 2014
“You fire shells at the houses and spray bullets at the orchard”When we went to take over [the next house], there was an orchard on the way. And crossing that is scary, you don’t know what’s in there. There was this crazy part when tanks were firing shells non-stop, and then all at once spraying machine gun fire into the entire orchard. You fire shells at the houses and spray bullets [at the orchard]. Eight, 10minutes like that, and then they say, “OK, you can start going through now.”continue reading ›
categories: Destruction of property, House incursions/takeovers, Rules of engagement93 views ›//0 comments ›rank: Staff Sergeant
unit: Infantry
area: Northern Gaza strip
period: 2014
“If you’re a Hamas militant, there would be no way that there wasn’t some house that just got taken down near you right now”One of the most senior officials in the IDF, he just marked off houses on an aerial photo of Shuja’iyya, to be taken down. He simply looked at the map and saw commanding points and commanding houses and [picked targets] in a way that was in some sense sort of randomcontinue reading ›
categories: Rules of engagement90 views ›//0 comments ›area: Gaza strip
period: 2014
Ultimately, they were all bombedTake [the neighborhood of] Shuja’iyya – almost all the locations on the forbidden list there were bombed. Each one had its own particular story, but ultimately, they were all bombedcontinue reading ›
categories: General, Rules of engagement86 views ›//0 comments ›rank: Lieutenant
unit: Infantry
area: Northern Gaza strip
period: 2014
“We’re blowing up this house, but we can’t eat this bag of Bamba?”They told us, “Don’t shit in the bathroom because it’ll get clogged and it’ll be awful.” So we would shit in plastic bags and chuck them out the window. The first few days it was really ugly and then it got a bit better. But it looks bad, first because you do everything quickly and you don’t care – and also because your security is top priority, it justifies everythingcontinue reading ›
categories: Destruction of property, House incursions/takeovers, Rules of engagement84 views ›//0 comments ›rank: Staff Sergeant
unit: Infantry
area: Northern Gaza strip
period: 2014
“This was one very stubborn family”We saw Gazan civilians only once, in daylight. They just came over, with their hands up. One Friday morning I saw a family going out to the street, their hands up, like in the moviescontinue reading ›
categories: Rules of engagement83 views ›//0 comments ›rank: Staff Sergeant
unit: Infantry
area: Northern Gaza strip
period: 2014
“The lives of our soldiers come before the lives of enemy civilians”I think there was operational justification for blowing up houses – but the policy was a bit trigger-happy. There was this bumper sticker during the operation that said, ‘The lives of our soldiers come before the lives of enemy civilians.’ This was sort of the policy because all these things really help protect the lives of IDF soldiers, and so the question becomes, where is the line? Or in which cases do we risk the lives of IDF soldiers because of certain values, because of ethics? That’s a big questioncontinue reading ›
categories: House demolitions/razing, Rules of engagement77 views ›//0 comments ›rank: Staff Sergeant
unit: Mechanized infantry
area: Gaza strip
period: 2014
“Shooting if you feel threatened is absolutely the most moral thing to do”The gunner is searching, and he knows that he is expected to ultimately locate people in windows. He says, “I spotted something in that window,” and the commander looks along with him. He looks, they verify and then he says, “Authorized” and they shootcontinue reading ›
categories: Rules of engagement76 views ›//0 comments ›rank: Staff Sergeant
unit: Armored Corps
area: Deir al-Balah area
period: 2014
We were encouraged to avoid directing high-arc trajectory fire into built-up areas
categories: Rules of engagement93 views ›//0 comments ›rank: Major
unit: Infantry
area: Northern Gaza strip
period: 2014
“You fire shells at the houses and spray bullets at the orchard”When we went to take over [the next house], there was an orchard on the way. And crossing that is scary, you don’t know what’s in there. There was this crazy part when tanks were firing shells non-stop, and then all at once spraying machine gun fire into the entire orchard. You fire shells at the houses and spray bullets [at the orchard]. Eight, 10minutes like that, and then they say, “OK, you can start going through now.”continue reading ›
categories: Destruction of property, House incursions/takeovers, Rules of engagement93 views ›//0 comments ›rank: Staff Sergeant
unit: Infantry
area: Northern Gaza strip
period: 2014
“If you’re a Hamas militant, there would be no way that there wasn’t some house that just got taken down near you right now”One of the most senior officials in the IDF, he just marked off houses on an aerial photo of Shuja’iyya, to be taken down. He simply looked at the map and saw commanding points and commanding houses and [picked targets] in a way that was in some sense sort of randomcontinue reading ›
categories: Rules of engagement90 views ›//0 comments ›area: Gaza strip
period: 2014
Ultimately, they were all bombedTake [the neighborhood of] Shuja’iyya – almost all the locations on the forbidden list there were bombed. Each one had its own particular story, but ultimately, they were all bombedcontinue reading ›
categories: General, Rules of engagement86 views ›//0 comments ›rank: Lieutenant
unit: Infantry
area: Northern Gaza strip
period: 2014
“We’re blowing up this house, but we can’t eat this bag of Bamba?”They told us, “Don’t shit in the bathroom because it’ll get clogged and it’ll be awful.” So we would shit in plastic bags and chuck them out the window. The first few days it was really ugly and then it got a bit better. But it looks bad, first because you do everything quickly and you don’t care – and also because your security is top priority, it justifies everythingcontinue reading ›
categories: Destruction of property, House incursions/takeovers, Rules of engagement84 views ›//0 comments ›rank: Staff Sergeant
unit: Infantry
area: Northern Gaza strip
period: 2014
“This was one very stubborn family”We saw Gazan civilians only once, in daylight. They just came over, with their hands up. One Friday morning I saw a family going out to the street, their hands up, like in the moviescontinue reading ›
categories: Rules of engagement83 views ›//0 comments ›rank: Staff Sergeant
unit: Infantry
area: Northern Gaza strip
period: 2014
“The lives of our soldiers come before the lives of enemy civilians”I think there was operational justification for blowing up houses – but the policy was a bit trigger-happy. There was this bumper sticker during the operation that said, ‘The lives of our soldiers come before the lives of enemy civilians.’ This was sort of the policy because all these things really help protect the lives of IDF soldiers, and so the question becomes, where is the line? Or in which cases do we risk the lives of IDF soldiers because of certain values, because of ethics? That’s a big questioncontinue reading ›
categories: House demolitions/razing, Rules of engagement77 views ›//0 comments ›rank: Staff Sergeant
unit: Mechanized infantry
area: Gaza strip
period: 2014
“Shooting if you feel threatened is absolutely the most moral thing to do”The gunner is searching, and he knows that he is expected to ultimately locate people in windows. He says, “I spotted something in that window,” and the commander looks along with him. He looks, they verify and then he says, “Authorized” and they shootcontinue reading ›
categories: Rules of engagement76 views ›//0 comments ›rank: Staff Sergeant
unit: Armored Corps
area: Deir al-Balah area
period: 2014
We were encouraged to avoid directing high-arc trajectory fire into built-up areas
testimony catalog number: 180632
rank: Lieutenant
unit: Infantry
area: Northern Gaza strip
period: 2014
The artillery is constantly firing. It’s called ‘retaining tension’ – that is, keeping [Hamas] unsure about when exactly we will be going in – so that they are constantly thinking that we might be about to go in. It’s called ‘softening targets,’ and it’s done also to clear a range for advancing. What this means in practice is, that shells are being fired all the time. Even if we aren’t actually going to enter: shells, shells, shells.
A suspicious structure, an open area, a field, a place where a tunnel shaft could be – fire, fire, fire. There was a period of about five days from the moment when we were first called in for duty until there was a ground incursion. Throughout that entire time, fire. The idea behind the action being – both during the fighting and after it – that from the moment you incriminate a building – incriminate meaning that you saw some movement there, even the smallest – a terrorist going in, maybe – those are sufficient grounds to take it down.
The entire building?
Yes. At the beginning [of the operation] they were really careful, they tried to do this with combat choppers, or guided missiles or all kinds of special forces. But the deeper we got into the operation, and the more the patience and understanding given to you by the levels of oversight – and by the Israeli public at large – slowly runs out, then it becomes OK to use artillery.
“You don’t need a chopper, let’s use artillery on it, let’s bring it down, no problem with that.” It’s statistical – it has a 50 meter radius. In the end, that’s one of the problems, too – [mortars are] a statistical weapon (an imprecise weapon that cannot be aimed at specific targets, but rather at general areas), and people don’t get that. There is this conception that we know how to do everything super accurately, as if it doesn’t matter which weapon is being used – “OK, let them fire, they’re OK.”
But no, these weapons are statistical, and they strike 50 meters to the right or 100 meters to the left, and it’s… It’s unpleasant. What happens is, for seven straight days it’s non-stop bombardment, that’s what happens in practice. Now, there are degrees of applying fire – in the first degree, you can fire up to a certain distance away from civilians, or from a place where civilians are believed to be.
In the second degree, you narrow that down. And there’s a third degree. Let’s say, [when the third level is imposed] the instructions for jets and combat choppers allow for ‘reasonable damage to civilians or to their surroundings.’ That is to say, something indefinable, that’s up to the brigade commander and whatever mood he happens to be in: “Let’s decide ourselves what’s reasonable and what isn’t.”
rank: Lieutenant
unit: Infantry
area: Northern Gaza strip
period: 2014
The artillery is constantly firing. It’s called ‘retaining tension’ – that is, keeping [Hamas] unsure about when exactly we will be going in – so that they are constantly thinking that we might be about to go in. It’s called ‘softening targets,’ and it’s done also to clear a range for advancing. What this means in practice is, that shells are being fired all the time. Even if we aren’t actually going to enter: shells, shells, shells.
A suspicious structure, an open area, a field, a place where a tunnel shaft could be – fire, fire, fire. There was a period of about five days from the moment when we were first called in for duty until there was a ground incursion. Throughout that entire time, fire. The idea behind the action being – both during the fighting and after it – that from the moment you incriminate a building – incriminate meaning that you saw some movement there, even the smallest – a terrorist going in, maybe – those are sufficient grounds to take it down.
The entire building?
Yes. At the beginning [of the operation] they were really careful, they tried to do this with combat choppers, or guided missiles or all kinds of special forces. But the deeper we got into the operation, and the more the patience and understanding given to you by the levels of oversight – and by the Israeli public at large – slowly runs out, then it becomes OK to use artillery.
“You don’t need a chopper, let’s use artillery on it, let’s bring it down, no problem with that.” It’s statistical – it has a 50 meter radius. In the end, that’s one of the problems, too – [mortars are] a statistical weapon (an imprecise weapon that cannot be aimed at specific targets, but rather at general areas), and people don’t get that. There is this conception that we know how to do everything super accurately, as if it doesn’t matter which weapon is being used – “OK, let them fire, they’re OK.”
But no, these weapons are statistical, and they strike 50 meters to the right or 100 meters to the left, and it’s… It’s unpleasant. What happens is, for seven straight days it’s non-stop bombardment, that’s what happens in practice. Now, there are degrees of applying fire – in the first degree, you can fire up to a certain distance away from civilians, or from a place where civilians are believed to be.
In the second degree, you narrow that down. And there’s a third degree. Let’s say, [when the third level is imposed] the instructions for jets and combat choppers allow for ‘reasonable damage to civilians or to their surroundings.’ That is to say, something indefinable, that’s up to the brigade commander and whatever mood he happens to be in: “Let’s decide ourselves what’s reasonable and what isn’t.”
- This testimony appears under these categories: House demolitions/razing, Rules of engagement
- This testimony can also be read in Hebrew
testimony catalog number: 30930
rank: Staff Sergeant
unit: Mechanized infantry
area: Deir al-Balah area
period: 2014
We were in the area of al-Bureij, at the center of the [Gaza] Strip. When we entered for the first time we didn’t see a single person. We saw no enemy, and no [civilians] either.
We went into houses, some of which were already riddled with holes. [The forces that entered the area before us] purposely left a few standing for us, so we ‘opened’ them up the way we were taught to in urban area combat training. We broke down the door, entered, ‘cleaned’ the house with bullets; you walk in shooting.
In the beginning you shoot [across a wide area] in a fan, ‘open’ anything that looks weird, you roll up carpets, move things around to make sure there’s absolutely nothing there. The house was totally abandoned. In most places [IDF] soldiers also shot the water tanks (usually located on rooftops).
Why?
Don’t know. When I got to the houses that’s how it was.
How is a house sweep carried out?
First thing, before you even enter, you shoot at certain spots. I would shoot – from behind a barrier of some sort – at dangerous spots: closets, beds that might be concealing something underneath them or inside them, inside the mattress. You shoot at everything, even refrigerators.
As for [cooking] gas canisters, we didn’t shoot them – we took them out and emptied the gas. Besides packs of cigarettes, we didn’t find anything valuable. One could say those cigarettes saved some people’s sanity, because there was a day we ran out. And then we stayed put in the house and secured ourselves.
“You are guarding the tanks,” they told us, but we didn’t really guard a single tank. We sat around in Gaza and took it easy. We surveyed. They gave us locations to watch. We were staying in abandoned houses. The people’s stuff was left inside, but not things like electrical appliances. They must have taken everything – they fled.
I did not see any casualties that were not clearly enemies there, because everyone was told to flee north from the very start. That’s what we knew. They left their houses closed up tight. It was clear that people had been preparing for our entry. [When we went in] we turned the houses upside down, because there was no other choice, you had to.
We found weapons. What was really awful was seeing lots of animals that they had left behind, their personal pets, they fled without them. People left their dogs behind – it was a pretty awful sight. You would see dogs with collars on. It was clear these were pets, not guard dogs. We looked after them as much as we could, but I’m sure the dogs there just died. We saw lots of animals there – farm animals, too. Entire groups of ducks and chickens. The animals didn’t know a war was coming. It’s not some natural disaster, they can’t sense it coming. We saw carcasses too. Mostly carcasses belonging to large animals, like donkeys.
rank: Staff Sergeant
unit: Mechanized infantry
area: Deir al-Balah area
period: 2014
We were in the area of al-Bureij, at the center of the [Gaza] Strip. When we entered for the first time we didn’t see a single person. We saw no enemy, and no [civilians] either.
We went into houses, some of which were already riddled with holes. [The forces that entered the area before us] purposely left a few standing for us, so we ‘opened’ them up the way we were taught to in urban area combat training. We broke down the door, entered, ‘cleaned’ the house with bullets; you walk in shooting.
In the beginning you shoot [across a wide area] in a fan, ‘open’ anything that looks weird, you roll up carpets, move things around to make sure there’s absolutely nothing there. The house was totally abandoned. In most places [IDF] soldiers also shot the water tanks (usually located on rooftops).
Why?
Don’t know. When I got to the houses that’s how it was.
How is a house sweep carried out?
First thing, before you even enter, you shoot at certain spots. I would shoot – from behind a barrier of some sort – at dangerous spots: closets, beds that might be concealing something underneath them or inside them, inside the mattress. You shoot at everything, even refrigerators.
As for [cooking] gas canisters, we didn’t shoot them – we took them out and emptied the gas. Besides packs of cigarettes, we didn’t find anything valuable. One could say those cigarettes saved some people’s sanity, because there was a day we ran out. And then we stayed put in the house and secured ourselves.
“You are guarding the tanks,” they told us, but we didn’t really guard a single tank. We sat around in Gaza and took it easy. We surveyed. They gave us locations to watch. We were staying in abandoned houses. The people’s stuff was left inside, but not things like electrical appliances. They must have taken everything – they fled.
I did not see any casualties that were not clearly enemies there, because everyone was told to flee north from the very start. That’s what we knew. They left their houses closed up tight. It was clear that people had been preparing for our entry. [When we went in] we turned the houses upside down, because there was no other choice, you had to.
We found weapons. What was really awful was seeing lots of animals that they had left behind, their personal pets, they fled without them. People left their dogs behind – it was a pretty awful sight. You would see dogs with collars on. It was clear these were pets, not guard dogs. We looked after them as much as we could, but I’m sure the dogs there just died. We saw lots of animals there – farm animals, too. Entire groups of ducks and chickens. The animals didn’t know a war was coming. It’s not some natural disaster, they can’t sense it coming. We saw carcasses too. Mostly carcasses belonging to large animals, like donkeys.
- This testimony appears under these categories: House demolitions/razing, House incursions/takeovers, Looting, Rules of engagement
- This testimony can also be read in Hebrew
testimony catalog number: 504246
rank: Staff Sergeant
unit: Infantry
area: Northern Gaza strip
period: 2014
For the first five days we were in the same house. Most of the time we weren’t doing anything, really. There were explosions all the time, and the noise from the drones pierced your brain. Once in a while you hear them shout, ‘fire barrage’ and then everyone covers their ears and ‘rat-tat-tat…’ You stop everything and then keep going.
After that we moved on to another house. We advanced to the next line of houses and then to the next. At no point did I see an enemy. There were no face-to-face engagements. Every house we entered, we were forbidden to enter through its door. Either you blow it up with an [anti-tank rocket], you make a hole, or a D9 (armored bulldozer) comes over and takes a wall down. There was lots of fire, lots.
Did the guys from the battalion take any hits?
They did, but even those who did – none of them actually saw an enemy with their own eyes.
You didn’t return fire?
We did, the whole area gets blown up – gets hit with heavy barrages. But you just fire kind of randomly, at the windows… It was very organized. There’s a dividing line, and you know that there are no forces of ours across it when you shoot. There isn’t a soul around, the streets are empty, no civilians. At no point did I see a single person who wasn’t a soldier.
We fired a lot. In total we launched about 500grenades, I think. They were always directed at windows, doors, cars, but they were never direct. That’s policy, that’s what we’re taught, it’s also what’s taught in basic training. If you’re fired at – you open fire. It doesn’t matter where, in what direction; you show them that you’re responding.
The first thing is to return a few bullets and then to take cover and get a sense of what’s going on. To show that we’re strong, that we respond and don’t go silent. We would fire heavy machine guns and grenade launchers, heavy fire. There were synchronized barrages – every night, once an hour, [all of us] fire a barrage together at all the houses, ‘rat-tat-tat’ we blow up all the windows in the area then go silent for a moment and see if there is any reaction, then another barrage, then go silent again.
Did you identify fire in your direction from these areas?
Even if we didn’t.
So why shoot there?
To try and trigger a response, to deter. Our objective at that time was not to eliminate anyone we saw – our objective was to blow up the two tunnels we were sitting right on top of. We kept this line for five days and made sure no one came near. Why would anyone come near? To die?
rank: Staff Sergeant
unit: Infantry
area: Northern Gaza strip
period: 2014
For the first five days we were in the same house. Most of the time we weren’t doing anything, really. There were explosions all the time, and the noise from the drones pierced your brain. Once in a while you hear them shout, ‘fire barrage’ and then everyone covers their ears and ‘rat-tat-tat…’ You stop everything and then keep going.
After that we moved on to another house. We advanced to the next line of houses and then to the next. At no point did I see an enemy. There were no face-to-face engagements. Every house we entered, we were forbidden to enter through its door. Either you blow it up with an [anti-tank rocket], you make a hole, or a D9 (armored bulldozer) comes over and takes a wall down. There was lots of fire, lots.
Did the guys from the battalion take any hits?
They did, but even those who did – none of them actually saw an enemy with their own eyes.
You didn’t return fire?
We did, the whole area gets blown up – gets hit with heavy barrages. But you just fire kind of randomly, at the windows… It was very organized. There’s a dividing line, and you know that there are no forces of ours across it when you shoot. There isn’t a soul around, the streets are empty, no civilians. At no point did I see a single person who wasn’t a soldier.
We fired a lot. In total we launched about 500grenades, I think. They were always directed at windows, doors, cars, but they were never direct. That’s policy, that’s what we’re taught, it’s also what’s taught in basic training. If you’re fired at – you open fire. It doesn’t matter where, in what direction; you show them that you’re responding.
The first thing is to return a few bullets and then to take cover and get a sense of what’s going on. To show that we’re strong, that we respond and don’t go silent. We would fire heavy machine guns and grenade launchers, heavy fire. There were synchronized barrages – every night, once an hour, [all of us] fire a barrage together at all the houses, ‘rat-tat-tat’ we blow up all the windows in the area then go silent for a moment and see if there is any reaction, then another barrage, then go silent again.
Did you identify fire in your direction from these areas?
Even if we didn’t.
So why shoot there?
To try and trigger a response, to deter. Our objective at that time was not to eliminate anyone we saw – our objective was to blow up the two tunnels we were sitting right on top of. We kept this line for five days and made sure no one came near. Why would anyone come near? To die?
- This testimony appears under these categories: House incursions/takeovers, Rules of engagement
- This testimony can also be read in Hebrew
testimony catalog number: 521716
area: Gaza strip
period: 2014
Guys there, they go in [to the Gaza Strip] wanting to bust up Hamas. There was this one intelligence officer there, a horrible guy, nobody could stand him, he just came over with an urge to take down targets, he couldn’t help it.
He comes over to you and for an entire hour is going, “Check what this is, and check what that is, why aren’t you attacking.”
The thing is, it’s not a yes-no black and white thing. It really depends on how you choose to deal with it. There are some people who will try to push for a certain target and it could be that that’s why it’ll be hit. They’ll talk to somebody they know, “Listen, do me a favor, prepare that target for me,” and then [the target] goes into the target list and passes through all the authorizations and it could be hit. That happens sometimes.
When did that happen?
You’ve got a lot of leeway there. It’s not cutting corners – you just figure out that it’s war, and it’s not all black and white, and you need to know when to be flexible, and there are lots of people there whose input goes a long way. Whenever they say something, their opinion is respected, and that’s what will be done.
area: Gaza strip
period: 2014
Guys there, they go in [to the Gaza Strip] wanting to bust up Hamas. There was this one intelligence officer there, a horrible guy, nobody could stand him, he just came over with an urge to take down targets, he couldn’t help it.
He comes over to you and for an entire hour is going, “Check what this is, and check what that is, why aren’t you attacking.”
The thing is, it’s not a yes-no black and white thing. It really depends on how you choose to deal with it. There are some people who will try to push for a certain target and it could be that that’s why it’ll be hit. They’ll talk to somebody they know, “Listen, do me a favor, prepare that target for me,” and then [the target] goes into the target list and passes through all the authorizations and it could be hit. That happens sometimes.
When did that happen?
You’ve got a lot of leeway there. It’s not cutting corners – you just figure out that it’s war, and it’s not all black and white, and you need to know when to be flexible, and there are lots of people there whose input goes a long way. Whenever they say something, their opinion is respected, and that’s what will be done.
- This testimony appears under these categories: General, Rules of engagement
- This testimony can also be read in Hebrew
testimony catalog number: 783044
rank: Staff Sergeant
unit: Armored Corps
area: Deir al-Balah area
period: 2014
During the first night [of the operation] we entered a place called Juhar al-Dik, a kind of suburb. While shooting a massive amount of fire, we entered some orchards. Orchards pose the biggest threat to armored forces – defending ourselves was a very difficult task.
[We fired] lots of little blasts toward suspicious places – at orchards, at the metal sheets that cover houses, at assorted concrete things – little blasts. A lot of machine gun fire, lots and lots. Once in a while shellfire – I fired two, I think, maybe three, at houses that slightly dominated us. Distances of 500 meters, or one kilometer.
After our night-time entrance into the Gaza Strip, to [the village of] Juhar al-Dik, morning came – between 7:00 and 8:00 AM – and we saw that there wasn’t anything to do, and people started dozing off. All the vehicles were together in a sort of strange circle, a kind of parking formation, after we had taken over the neighborhood during the night.
There was no threat and it was quiet, and then suddenly there’s this command on the two-way radio: “Guys, everyone form a row, facing the neighborhood of al-Bureij” – which was this neighborhood that could see us from far off – it had a view of Juhar al-Dik, and that was higher than us. That is, they could see everything and we couldn’t see everything from where they were. They were higher than us, and they could dominate us in terms of both fire and vision.
And [the commander] gives an order: “Guys, all the tanks in a row, firing positions, all together facing the neighborhood of al-Bureij, we’re commencing engagement.” ‘Engagement’ means everyone firing at once, a countdown, “3, 2, 1, fire.”
I remember it, all the tanks were standing in a row, and I personally asked my commander: “Where are we firing at?” He told me: “Pick wherever you feel like it.”
And later, during talks with the other guys – each one basically chose his own target, and the commander called it on the two-way radio, ‘Good morning al-Bureij.’
“We are carrying out, a ‘Good morning al-Bureij,’ guys” that was the quote. Basically to wake up the neighborhood, to show those guys that ‘the IDF is here,’ and to carry out deterrence.
I remember that all the tanks were standing in a row, and we were too, I was the gunner, and I looked at some building, which was very tall, at the center of that neighborhood, and I asked my commander, “OK, where do I hit that building?” And we decided between us – “OK, if you feel like aiming a bit to the right, a bit to the left, a bit toward that window, a bit toward the floor, let’s do that.”
And then the commander says on the radio: “3, 2, 1, fire.” And everyone fired shells wherever they wanted to, obviously. Nobody had opened fire at us – not before, not after, not during.
rank: Staff Sergeant
unit: Armored Corps
area: Deir al-Balah area
period: 2014
During the first night [of the operation] we entered a place called Juhar al-Dik, a kind of suburb. While shooting a massive amount of fire, we entered some orchards. Orchards pose the biggest threat to armored forces – defending ourselves was a very difficult task.
[We fired] lots of little blasts toward suspicious places – at orchards, at the metal sheets that cover houses, at assorted concrete things – little blasts. A lot of machine gun fire, lots and lots. Once in a while shellfire – I fired two, I think, maybe three, at houses that slightly dominated us. Distances of 500 meters, or one kilometer.
After our night-time entrance into the Gaza Strip, to [the village of] Juhar al-Dik, morning came – between 7:00 and 8:00 AM – and we saw that there wasn’t anything to do, and people started dozing off. All the vehicles were together in a sort of strange circle, a kind of parking formation, after we had taken over the neighborhood during the night.
There was no threat and it was quiet, and then suddenly there’s this command on the two-way radio: “Guys, everyone form a row, facing the neighborhood of al-Bureij” – which was this neighborhood that could see us from far off – it had a view of Juhar al-Dik, and that was higher than us. That is, they could see everything and we couldn’t see everything from where they were. They were higher than us, and they could dominate us in terms of both fire and vision.
And [the commander] gives an order: “Guys, all the tanks in a row, firing positions, all together facing the neighborhood of al-Bureij, we’re commencing engagement.” ‘Engagement’ means everyone firing at once, a countdown, “3, 2, 1, fire.”
I remember it, all the tanks were standing in a row, and I personally asked my commander: “Where are we firing at?” He told me: “Pick wherever you feel like it.”
And later, during talks with the other guys – each one basically chose his own target, and the commander called it on the two-way radio, ‘Good morning al-Bureij.’
“We are carrying out, a ‘Good morning al-Bureij,’ guys” that was the quote. Basically to wake up the neighborhood, to show those guys that ‘the IDF is here,’ and to carry out deterrence.
I remember that all the tanks were standing in a row, and we were too, I was the gunner, and I looked at some building, which was very tall, at the center of that neighborhood, and I asked my commander, “OK, where do I hit that building?” And we decided between us – “OK, if you feel like aiming a bit to the right, a bit to the left, a bit toward that window, a bit toward the floor, let’s do that.”
And then the commander says on the radio: “3, 2, 1, fire.” And everyone fired shells wherever they wanted to, obviously. Nobody had opened fire at us – not before, not after, not during.
- This testimony appears under these categories: Rules of engagement
- This testimony can also be read in Hebrew
testimony catalog number: 438564
rank: Staff Sergeant
unit: Infantry
area: Northern Gaza strip
period: 2014
When a [combat] engineering unit enters a house they blow up a wall, open up a hole, enter and then start by throwing grenades into the larger spaces. A grenade inside a house is super intense – within seconds the whole place is full of smoke.
The platoon commander throws a few grenades into the larger spaces, you turn on a flashlight fixed to your weapon and start shooting at all sorts of places. And then he and his team go in first. One platoon was about to ‘open’ a house with a MATADOR (portable anti-tank rocket), and there was a field interrogator – usually that’s a reservist who speaks Arabic who comes around with an electric megaphone and shouts really loudly that if anyone is in the house they should come out.
They were about to launch the rocket and then *** yelled, “Don’t shoot” because he could hear people inside the house, he saved an entire family. They found this family in one of the houses and moved them to another house, a two-minute walk from there. It was very weird, protecting them. We put them in the guest room. They were all sitting there on a sofa, on a mattress, sitting and not saying a word.
There were a few kids there, and a few women and someone who was definitely the father. He had the air of a father. *** guarded them first, and he had a bag of jelly candies in his pocket and he said he didn’t know whether to give them some. In the end we did give the kids some candy.
This is a dilemma we knew from Judea and Samaria (the West Bank). You have no reason to be nice to a Palestinian at a checkpoint – he won’t like you any better for it. You’re a son of a bitch, you’re oppressing him with this checkpoint you’re manning.
And he said the same thing: “These kids, what’s going on now is for sure the most traumatic thing to have ever happened in their lives until now – if I give them some jelly candy will they really feel any better? What kind of crap is that?” In the end he did give them candies, ‘cause they were cute.
And we brought them water, and then we realized they weren’t drinking or eating because this was during Ramadan and we had barged in before their Ramadan meal. An hour later somebody came around to escort them to the main route and bid them good luck.
rank: Staff Sergeant
unit: Infantry
area: Northern Gaza strip
period: 2014
When a [combat] engineering unit enters a house they blow up a wall, open up a hole, enter and then start by throwing grenades into the larger spaces. A grenade inside a house is super intense – within seconds the whole place is full of smoke.
The platoon commander throws a few grenades into the larger spaces, you turn on a flashlight fixed to your weapon and start shooting at all sorts of places. And then he and his team go in first. One platoon was about to ‘open’ a house with a MATADOR (portable anti-tank rocket), and there was a field interrogator – usually that’s a reservist who speaks Arabic who comes around with an electric megaphone and shouts really loudly that if anyone is in the house they should come out.
They were about to launch the rocket and then *** yelled, “Don’t shoot” because he could hear people inside the house, he saved an entire family. They found this family in one of the houses and moved them to another house, a two-minute walk from there. It was very weird, protecting them. We put them in the guest room. They were all sitting there on a sofa, on a mattress, sitting and not saying a word.
There were a few kids there, and a few women and someone who was definitely the father. He had the air of a father. *** guarded them first, and he had a bag of jelly candies in his pocket and he said he didn’t know whether to give them some. In the end we did give the kids some candy.
This is a dilemma we knew from Judea and Samaria (the West Bank). You have no reason to be nice to a Palestinian at a checkpoint – he won’t like you any better for it. You’re a son of a bitch, you’re oppressing him with this checkpoint you’re manning.
And he said the same thing: “These kids, what’s going on now is for sure the most traumatic thing to have ever happened in their lives until now – if I give them some jelly candy will they really feel any better? What kind of crap is that?” In the end he did give them candies, ‘cause they were cute.
And we brought them water, and then we realized they weren’t drinking or eating because this was during Ramadan and we had barged in before their Ramadan meal. An hour later somebody came around to escort them to the main route and bid them good luck.
- This testimony appears under these categories: House incursions/takeovers, Rules of engagement
- This testimony can also be read in Hebrew
testimony catalog number: 272302
rank: Staff Sergeant
unit: Infantry
area: Khan Yunis area
period: 2014
Was anything in particular stressed regarding rules of engagement?
Yes, they explained what you do if you see a civilian. [They explained that] that’s the way it is in combat. It was shoot to kill immediately if you see stuff.
But there was nothing organized – no one said, “If someone is dressed this way don’t shoot, if someone is dressed that way, shoot.” [It was more along the lines of] “If you see someone – shoot.” In the end you use your own judgment.
Really they did say, “If you see someone – shoot him.” There was this one house we entered. We entered it ‘wet,’ (using live fire) and suddenly we hear screaming from inside the house and this father came out of a room with his hands in the air. They stopped shooting, and within seconds the battalion’s field interrogator runs in and goes to talk to him.
They were in the house. A family: father, mother and three kids. They were asked why they were still there, why they had stayed. And they said, “Because this is our home, because we have nowhere to escape to.” In the end the platoon stayed in that house for like three days. That entire time, the family was in one room, they were told, “We are staying in this house in the meantime, you stay in that room.” A guard was assigned to them, and they were given Israeli food. After three days the platoon moved to another house. The family either stayed or left, I don’t know.
rank: Staff Sergeant
unit: Infantry
area: Khan Yunis area
period: 2014
Was anything in particular stressed regarding rules of engagement?
Yes, they explained what you do if you see a civilian. [They explained that] that’s the way it is in combat. It was shoot to kill immediately if you see stuff.
But there was nothing organized – no one said, “If someone is dressed this way don’t shoot, if someone is dressed that way, shoot.” [It was more along the lines of] “If you see someone – shoot.” In the end you use your own judgment.
Really they did say, “If you see someone – shoot him.” There was this one house we entered. We entered it ‘wet,’ (using live fire) and suddenly we hear screaming from inside the house and this father came out of a room with his hands in the air. They stopped shooting, and within seconds the battalion’s field interrogator runs in and goes to talk to him.
They were in the house. A family: father, mother and three kids. They were asked why they were still there, why they had stayed. And they said, “Because this is our home, because we have nowhere to escape to.” In the end the platoon stayed in that house for like three days. That entire time, the family was in one room, they were told, “We are staying in this house in the meantime, you stay in that room.” A guard was assigned to them, and they were given Israeli food. After three days the platoon moved to another house. The family either stayed or left, I don’t know.
- This testimony appears under these categories: House incursions/takeovers, Rules of engagement
- This testimony can also be read in Hebrew
testimony catalog number: 71388
rank: Lieutenant
unit: Infantry
period: 2014
With regard to artillery, the IDF let go of the restraints it once had. Ahead of every ground incursion there was a day of scouting and artillery was fired at the houses that formed the front line. There’s an artillery coordination officer in every unit, that’s his job. He works with maps, talks to the artillery corps and directs fire. I have no doubt – and I say this loud and clear – I have no doubt that artillery was fired on houses. Tanks, too, were firing a lot in there.
In what sort of situation is a tank’s aim directed at a house?
A unit commander speaks with the armored corps’ company commander, telling him, “I want you to shoot here, here and here. I’m going to go in there a little while. Shoot, so that if by any chance there are people in there that we don’t know about, at least the house will take a few hits before we enter.” You stay a safe range from the forces and fire.
The D9s (armored bulldozers) are operating during this time?
Always. Whenever tanks pass through central routes there will always be a D9 going through and clearing out the terrain before them in every direction, so that they’ll be able to pass through if there’s an explosive device or something in there. One of the high ranking commanders, he really liked the D9s. He was a real proponent of flattening things. He put them to good use. Let’s just say that after every time he was somewhere, all the infrastructure around the buildings was totally destroyed, almost every house had gotten a shell through it. He was very much in favor of that.
rank: Lieutenant
unit: Infantry
period: 2014
With regard to artillery, the IDF let go of the restraints it once had. Ahead of every ground incursion there was a day of scouting and artillery was fired at the houses that formed the front line. There’s an artillery coordination officer in every unit, that’s his job. He works with maps, talks to the artillery corps and directs fire. I have no doubt – and I say this loud and clear – I have no doubt that artillery was fired on houses. Tanks, too, were firing a lot in there.
In what sort of situation is a tank’s aim directed at a house?
A unit commander speaks with the armored corps’ company commander, telling him, “I want you to shoot here, here and here. I’m going to go in there a little while. Shoot, so that if by any chance there are people in there that we don’t know about, at least the house will take a few hits before we enter.” You stay a safe range from the forces and fire.
The D9s (armored bulldozers) are operating during this time?
Always. Whenever tanks pass through central routes there will always be a D9 going through and clearing out the terrain before them in every direction, so that they’ll be able to pass through if there’s an explosive device or something in there. One of the high ranking commanders, he really liked the D9s. He was a real proponent of flattening things. He put them to good use. Let’s just say that after every time he was somewhere, all the infrastructure around the buildings was totally destroyed, almost every house had gotten a shell through it. He was very much in favor of that.
- This testimony appears under these categories: Destruction of property, House demolitions/razing, Rules of engagement
- This testimony can also be read in Hebrew
Page: 2 - 1
