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testimony catalog number: 805611
rank: Staff Sergeant
area: Northern Gaza strip
period: 2014
We identified a few [figures]. Something black moving through the house – ‘black’ meaning hot. It took some work to secure a firepower source that could be used against the house. An aircraft was directed at it – and later we spotted ambulances [arriving] at the area and some kind of crowd.
The soldier and the officer weren’t sure they understood what had happened there, they weren’t sure it wasn’t some family they just took down in there. And later on the news there were reports of five deaths in that neighborhood.
There was no way to know, one doesn’t know for sure – but there was no way we could have [determined the figures in the house] were armed, or posed some kind of threat. It was clear to everyone that the possibility [of determining whether or not they were armed] was nonexistent, and it was clear to everyone that this was a gray zone where you say to yourself, “That could very well be an innocent person.”
If that’s an innocent person, what’s he doing there? It could be that a second later he’ll pull something out and endanger a soldier who is somewhere out there. It’s perfectly clear this was the situation there. This dilemma is always present, throughout the operation. You don’t know who’s innocent and who isn’t, and there are cases when you will never know. Seen in this light, [that incident] was very significant.
What was the distance between the forces and [the figures they spotted]?
I don’t know. We knew there were forces there, you could see tank rampart enclosures (Defensive compounds made of rubble embankments) here and there. But it wasn’t like there was a detailed update about where there were forces and what the distances were between them and the identification. You verify with the operation rooms that there are no [IDF] forces there, you inform the battalion, the battalion is supposed to arrange firepower from the division, that’s where the circle closes. It took a long time until they addressed that report, that’s why it took, like, two hours.
And what happens after those two hours?
They (the forces conducting the fire) get in touch with us for precise details, exact location, which window, which floor. It’s the most precise fire there is. And then they fired, and [reported] a hit.
rank: Staff Sergeant
area: Northern Gaza strip
period: 2014
We identified a few [figures]. Something black moving through the house – ‘black’ meaning hot. It took some work to secure a firepower source that could be used against the house. An aircraft was directed at it – and later we spotted ambulances [arriving] at the area and some kind of crowd.
The soldier and the officer weren’t sure they understood what had happened there, they weren’t sure it wasn’t some family they just took down in there. And later on the news there were reports of five deaths in that neighborhood.
There was no way to know, one doesn’t know for sure – but there was no way we could have [determined the figures in the house] were armed, or posed some kind of threat. It was clear to everyone that the possibility [of determining whether or not they were armed] was nonexistent, and it was clear to everyone that this was a gray zone where you say to yourself, “That could very well be an innocent person.”
If that’s an innocent person, what’s he doing there? It could be that a second later he’ll pull something out and endanger a soldier who is somewhere out there. It’s perfectly clear this was the situation there. This dilemma is always present, throughout the operation. You don’t know who’s innocent and who isn’t, and there are cases when you will never know. Seen in this light, [that incident] was very significant.
What was the distance between the forces and [the figures they spotted]?
I don’t know. We knew there were forces there, you could see tank rampart enclosures (Defensive compounds made of rubble embankments) here and there. But it wasn’t like there was a detailed update about where there were forces and what the distances were between them and the identification. You verify with the operation rooms that there are no [IDF] forces there, you inform the battalion, the battalion is supposed to arrange firepower from the division, that’s where the circle closes. It took a long time until they addressed that report, that’s why it took, like, two hours.
And what happens after those two hours?
They (the forces conducting the fire) get in touch with us for precise details, exact location, which window, which floor. It’s the most precise fire there is. And then they fired, and [reported] a hit.
- This testimony appears under these categories: Deaths, Rules of engagement
- This testimony can also be read in Hebrew
testimony catalog number: 375047
rank: Staff Sergeant
unit: Infantry
area: Northern Gaza strip
period: 2014
It was during our first Sabbath. Earlier that day one of the companies was hit by a few anti-tank missiles. The unit went to raid the area from which they were fired, so the guys who stayed behind automatically cared less about civilians.
I remember telling myself that right now, the citizens of Gaza, I really don’t give a fuck about them. They don’t deserve anything – and if they deserve something it’s either to be badly wounded or killed. That’s what was going through my mind during those moments.
There was this one time when an old [Palestinian] man approached the house and everyone remembered hearing about that booby-trapped old man (earlier in his testimony the testifier described being briefed about an elderly Palestinian man armed with grenades who tried to attack a different force).
This happened right around noon, between noon and 2:00 PM. So this old man came over, and the guy manning the post – I don’t know what was going through his head – he saw this civilian, and he fired at him, and he didn’t get a good hit. The civilian was laying there, writhing in pain.
We all remembered that story going around, so none of the paramedics wanted to go treat him. It was clear to everyone that one of two things was going to happen: Either we let him die slowly, or we put him out of his misery. Eventually, we put him out of his misery, and a D9 (armored bulldozer) came over and dropped a mound of rubble on him and that was the end of it.
In order to avoid having to deal with the question of whether he was booby-trapped or not – because that really didn’t interest anyone at that moment – the D9 came over, dropped a pile of rubble on his body and that was it. Everyone knew that under that pile there was the guy’s corpse.
What came up during the investigation when the company commander asked the soldier, was that the soldier spotted a man in his late 60s, early 70s approaching the house. They were stationed in a tall house, with a good vantage point. The soldier spotted that guy going in his direction, toward his post. So he shot in the direction of his feet at the beginning. And he said the old man kept getting closer to the house so he shot a bullet beneath his left ribs. Kidney, liver, I don’t know what’s in there.
A spot you don’t want to be hit by a bullet. That old man took the bullet, lay down on the ground, then a friend of that soldier came over and also shot the man, while he was already down. For the hell of it, he shot two more bullets at his legs. Meanwhile there was a talk with the commander, and because this was happening amidst a battalion offensive, it really didn’t interest anyone. “We have casualties up front, don’t bother us, do what you need to do.”
What were the lessons derived from that incident?
The lessons were less about conduct with civilians, because you can’t define conduct with civilians on the company level. That’s the ‘problem’ with combat in a place like the Gaza Strip. With regard to lessons learned, they were primarily related to defense: where to position defense posts, guarding protocols, is guarding done in pairs? That was the level of discussion over lessons to be learned from this incident.
rank: Staff Sergeant
unit: Infantry
area: Northern Gaza strip
period: 2014
It was during our first Sabbath. Earlier that day one of the companies was hit by a few anti-tank missiles. The unit went to raid the area from which they were fired, so the guys who stayed behind automatically cared less about civilians.
I remember telling myself that right now, the citizens of Gaza, I really don’t give a fuck about them. They don’t deserve anything – and if they deserve something it’s either to be badly wounded or killed. That’s what was going through my mind during those moments.
There was this one time when an old [Palestinian] man approached the house and everyone remembered hearing about that booby-trapped old man (earlier in his testimony the testifier described being briefed about an elderly Palestinian man armed with grenades who tried to attack a different force).
This happened right around noon, between noon and 2:00 PM. So this old man came over, and the guy manning the post – I don’t know what was going through his head – he saw this civilian, and he fired at him, and he didn’t get a good hit. The civilian was laying there, writhing in pain.
We all remembered that story going around, so none of the paramedics wanted to go treat him. It was clear to everyone that one of two things was going to happen: Either we let him die slowly, or we put him out of his misery. Eventually, we put him out of his misery, and a D9 (armored bulldozer) came over and dropped a mound of rubble on him and that was the end of it.
In order to avoid having to deal with the question of whether he was booby-trapped or not – because that really didn’t interest anyone at that moment – the D9 came over, dropped a pile of rubble on his body and that was it. Everyone knew that under that pile there was the guy’s corpse.
What came up during the investigation when the company commander asked the soldier, was that the soldier spotted a man in his late 60s, early 70s approaching the house. They were stationed in a tall house, with a good vantage point. The soldier spotted that guy going in his direction, toward his post. So he shot in the direction of his feet at the beginning. And he said the old man kept getting closer to the house so he shot a bullet beneath his left ribs. Kidney, liver, I don’t know what’s in there.
A spot you don’t want to be hit by a bullet. That old man took the bullet, lay down on the ground, then a friend of that soldier came over and also shot the man, while he was already down. For the hell of it, he shot two more bullets at his legs. Meanwhile there was a talk with the commander, and because this was happening amidst a battalion offensive, it really didn’t interest anyone. “We have casualties up front, don’t bother us, do what you need to do.”
What were the lessons derived from that incident?
The lessons were less about conduct with civilians, because you can’t define conduct with civilians on the company level. That’s the ‘problem’ with combat in a place like the Gaza Strip. With regard to lessons learned, they were primarily related to defense: where to position defense posts, guarding protocols, is guarding done in pairs? That was the level of discussion over lessons to be learned from this incident.
- This testimony appears under these categories: Deaths, General, Rules of engagement
- This testimony can also be read in Hebrew
testimony catalog number: 182607
rank: Staff Sergeant
unit: Infantry
area: Northern Gaza strip
period: 2014
We were in a house with the reconnaissance platoon, and there was some soldier stationed at the guard post. We were instructed [during the briefings] that whoever’s in the area is dangerous, is suspect. Especially if it’s a vehicle – in that case you really pound it with bullets, everybody stationed in the posts.
[There was one case where] a soldier who was in one of the posts saw an old [Palestinian] man approaching, so he shouted that some old man was getting near. He didn’t shoot at him – he fired near him. What I know, because I checked this, is that one of the other soldiers shot that grandpa twice.
A big hoopla got going, everyone got their gear quick and wanted to go outside because, like they say in the IDF, ‘strive for engagement.’ I went up to a window to see what was going on out there, and I saw there was an old man lying on the ground, he was shot in his leg and he was wounded. It was horrible, the wound was horrible, and he looked either dead or unconscious to me.
So we went down and told that entire force – these guys were all truly twisted – “Enough, there’s no reason to shoot him, get a grip, he’s dead.” And so an argument starts up [between the soldiers]: “What makes you an expert on death? What are you, some doctor?”
And then after that, some guy from the company went out and shot that man again, and that, for me, was the last straw.
I don’t think there was a single guy in my platoon who wasn’t shocked by that. It’s not like we’re a bunch of leftists, but – why? Like, what the hell, why did you have to shoot him again? One of the problems in this story is that there was no inquiry into it, at least none that I know of.
Not a word was spoken to us about it later on – nobody told us how we were expected to behave. So we hashed out our own conclusions – that the first two bullets were justified because if he had an IED on him, then what?
What was it for, really?
Dead checking. I don’t buy it. You leave [the Gaza Strip] and the most obvious question is, ‘did you kill anybody?’ What can you do – even if you’ll meet the most left-wing girl in the world, eventually she’ll start thinking, “Did you ever kill somebody, or not?” And what can you do about it, most people in our society consider that to be a badge of honor. So everybody wants to come out of there with that feeling of satisfaction.
That’s what shocked me the most. We have guys in our company walking around with X’s marked on their straps, it’s a sort of culture. Maybe it sounds to you like I’m exaggerating, but… I’d like for this whole thing of X marks – even if it’s somebody who just saved an entire Israeli family – to be forbidden. Because when it comes down to it, when we don’t need to use fire, then people – even if they are very good people – something in their mind just jerks.
rank: Staff Sergeant
unit: Infantry
area: Northern Gaza strip
period: 2014
We were in a house with the reconnaissance platoon, and there was some soldier stationed at the guard post. We were instructed [during the briefings] that whoever’s in the area is dangerous, is suspect. Especially if it’s a vehicle – in that case you really pound it with bullets, everybody stationed in the posts.
[There was one case where] a soldier who was in one of the posts saw an old [Palestinian] man approaching, so he shouted that some old man was getting near. He didn’t shoot at him – he fired near him. What I know, because I checked this, is that one of the other soldiers shot that grandpa twice.
A big hoopla got going, everyone got their gear quick and wanted to go outside because, like they say in the IDF, ‘strive for engagement.’ I went up to a window to see what was going on out there, and I saw there was an old man lying on the ground, he was shot in his leg and he was wounded. It was horrible, the wound was horrible, and he looked either dead or unconscious to me.
So we went down and told that entire force – these guys were all truly twisted – “Enough, there’s no reason to shoot him, get a grip, he’s dead.” And so an argument starts up [between the soldiers]: “What makes you an expert on death? What are you, some doctor?”
And then after that, some guy from the company went out and shot that man again, and that, for me, was the last straw.
I don’t think there was a single guy in my platoon who wasn’t shocked by that. It’s not like we’re a bunch of leftists, but – why? Like, what the hell, why did you have to shoot him again? One of the problems in this story is that there was no inquiry into it, at least none that I know of.
Not a word was spoken to us about it later on – nobody told us how we were expected to behave. So we hashed out our own conclusions – that the first two bullets were justified because if he had an IED on him, then what?
What was it for, really?
Dead checking. I don’t buy it. You leave [the Gaza Strip] and the most obvious question is, ‘did you kill anybody?’ What can you do – even if you’ll meet the most left-wing girl in the world, eventually she’ll start thinking, “Did you ever kill somebody, or not?” And what can you do about it, most people in our society consider that to be a badge of honor. So everybody wants to come out of there with that feeling of satisfaction.
That’s what shocked me the most. We have guys in our company walking around with X’s marked on their straps, it’s a sort of culture. Maybe it sounds to you like I’m exaggerating, but… I’d like for this whole thing of X marks – even if it’s somebody who just saved an entire Israeli family – to be forbidden. Because when it comes down to it, when we don’t need to use fire, then people – even if they are very good people – something in their mind just jerks.
- This testimony appears under these categories: Confirmation of killing, House incursions/takeovers, Rules of engagement
- This testimony can also be read in Hebrew
testimony catalog number: 611701
rank: Staff Sergeant
unit: Armored Corps
area: Deir al-Balah area
period: 2014
We entered a neighborhood with orchards, which is the scariest. There were lots of stories going around about being surprised by tunnels or explosive devices in these orchards. When you go in you fire at lots of suspicious places. You shoot at bushes, at trees, at all sorts of houses you suddenly run into, at more trees. You fire a blast and don’t think twice about it. When we first entered [the Gaza Strip] there was this ethos about Hamas – we were certain that the moment we went in our tanks would all be up in flames.
But after 48 hours during which no one shoots at you and they’re like ghosts, unseen, their presence unfelt – except once in a while the sound of one shot fired over the course of an entire day – you come to realize the situation is under control. And that’s when my difficulty there started, because the formal rules of engagement – I don’t know if for all soldiers – were, “Anything still there is as good as dead. Anything you see moving in the neighborhoods you’re in is not supposed to be there. The [Palestinian] civilians know they are not supposed to be there. Therefore whoever you see there, you kill.”
Who gave that order?
The commander. “Anything you see in the neighborhoods you’re in, anything within a reasonable distance, say between zero and 200 meters – is dead on the spot. No authorization needed.” We asked him: “I see someone walking in the street, do I shoot him?” He said yes. “Why do I shoot him?” “Because he isn’t supposed to be there. Nobody, no sane civilian who isn’t a terrorist, has any business being within 200 meters of a tank. And if he places himself in such a situation, he is apparently up to something.” Every place you took over, anything you ‘sterilized,’ anything within a range of zero to 200 meters, 300 meters –that’s supposed to be a ‘sterilized’ area, from our perspective.
Did the commander discuss what happens if you run into civilians or uninvolved people?
There are none. The working assumption states – and I want to stress that this is a quote of sorts: that anyone located in an IDF area, in areas the IDF took over – is not [considered] a civilian. That is the working assumption. We entered Gaza with that in mind, and with an insane amount of firepower. I don’t know if it was proportionate or not. I don’t claim to be a battalion commander or a general. But it reached a point where a single tank – and remember, there were 11 of those just where I was – fires between 20 and 30 shells per day. The two-way radio was crazy when we entered. There was one reservist tank company that positioned itself up on a hill and started firing. They fired lots – that company’s formal numbers stood at something like 150 shells per day. They fired, fired, fired. They started pounding things down two hours ahead [of the entrance].
What did they fire at?
They were providing cover during the entrance [to the Gaza Strip]. They were shooting mostly at al-Bureij, which is a neighborhood with a dominant geographical vantage point, and is also a Hamas stronghold, according to what we were told. I don’t know exactly what they were firing at and what they were using, but I do know they were firing a lot, tearing down that neighborhood, tearing it down to a whole new level. About 150 shells per day.
rank: Staff Sergeant
unit: Armored Corps
area: Deir al-Balah area
period: 2014
We entered a neighborhood with orchards, which is the scariest. There were lots of stories going around about being surprised by tunnels or explosive devices in these orchards. When you go in you fire at lots of suspicious places. You shoot at bushes, at trees, at all sorts of houses you suddenly run into, at more trees. You fire a blast and don’t think twice about it. When we first entered [the Gaza Strip] there was this ethos about Hamas – we were certain that the moment we went in our tanks would all be up in flames.
But after 48 hours during which no one shoots at you and they’re like ghosts, unseen, their presence unfelt – except once in a while the sound of one shot fired over the course of an entire day – you come to realize the situation is under control. And that’s when my difficulty there started, because the formal rules of engagement – I don’t know if for all soldiers – were, “Anything still there is as good as dead. Anything you see moving in the neighborhoods you’re in is not supposed to be there. The [Palestinian] civilians know they are not supposed to be there. Therefore whoever you see there, you kill.”
Who gave that order?
The commander. “Anything you see in the neighborhoods you’re in, anything within a reasonable distance, say between zero and 200 meters – is dead on the spot. No authorization needed.” We asked him: “I see someone walking in the street, do I shoot him?” He said yes. “Why do I shoot him?” “Because he isn’t supposed to be there. Nobody, no sane civilian who isn’t a terrorist, has any business being within 200 meters of a tank. And if he places himself in such a situation, he is apparently up to something.” Every place you took over, anything you ‘sterilized,’ anything within a range of zero to 200 meters, 300 meters –that’s supposed to be a ‘sterilized’ area, from our perspective.
Did the commander discuss what happens if you run into civilians or uninvolved people?
There are none. The working assumption states – and I want to stress that this is a quote of sorts: that anyone located in an IDF area, in areas the IDF took over – is not [considered] a civilian. That is the working assumption. We entered Gaza with that in mind, and with an insane amount of firepower. I don’t know if it was proportionate or not. I don’t claim to be a battalion commander or a general. But it reached a point where a single tank – and remember, there were 11 of those just where I was – fires between 20 and 30 shells per day. The two-way radio was crazy when we entered. There was one reservist tank company that positioned itself up on a hill and started firing. They fired lots – that company’s formal numbers stood at something like 150 shells per day. They fired, fired, fired. They started pounding things down two hours ahead [of the entrance].
What did they fire at?
They were providing cover during the entrance [to the Gaza Strip]. They were shooting mostly at al-Bureij, which is a neighborhood with a dominant geographical vantage point, and is also a Hamas stronghold, according to what we were told. I don’t know exactly what they were firing at and what they were using, but I do know they were firing a lot, tearing down that neighborhood, tearing it down to a whole new level. About 150 shells per day.
- This testimony appears under these categories: House demolitions/razing, Rules of engagement
- This testimony can also be read in Hebrew
testimony catalog number: 402621
rank: Staff Sergeant
unit: Armored Corps
area: Khan Yunis area
period: 2014
When we first entered [the Gaza Strip], when we took over houses, there was this thing of ‘provoking’ the area. If you’re standing for hours and the tank is idle, you don’t start driving back and forth. There’s no comparison between a tank that’s in motion and a tank that’s idle. An idle tank is 1,000 times more vulnerable, and you can’t just drive around for seven hours if you’re stationed at a certain building. So once in a while there were steps we would take to ‘provoke’ the area. What does that mean? It means machine gun fire at ‘suspicious spots.’
What are ‘suspicious spots’?
Bushes, suspicious buildings.
When you fire at a ‘suspicious spot’ that’s a building, do you fire toward the window or toward the corner of the structure?
The corner. You want to ‘provoke’ the area and make sure that if there’s someone in there he won’t suddenly pop his head out and screw you with some anti-tank missile.
You stay inside the vehicles but start shooting at ‘suspicious spots’?
Every few hours, not the whole time. Every five hours that the tank is idle, it’s better to ‘provoke’ the place.
The commander would tell you to shoot ‘provocation fire’ at a preordained time, and the targets were chosen by the tank team? By the tank commander?
Yes, in accordance with what you have around you. You locate ‘suspicious spots’ – one doesn’t need to be a genius to do that. There’s no precise definition, but you know a ‘suspicious spot’ when you see it. You analyze the area, figure out what’s what, which house is tall and has command over you, which windows are pointed right in your direction. And then wham, I fire a burst. You don’t waste shells, you don’t just shoot shells for no reason.
Up to what range can you define something as a ‘suspicious spot?’
Any range. In principle, any house that can see me, that’s within eyeshot of me, which could take me down – can be defined as suspicious. We would scan the entire range – any place within eyeshot.
What’s the farthest point?
Hundreds of meters away from us. I’ll give you a stupid example, it’s even sort of funny. There was one night when someone said, “I saw [movement] over there.” The whole time, of course, we’re on the two-way radio making sure, asking questions – you don’t want to find out that one of your guys went out to take a dump and you accidently shot him. So he said, “I saw it for certain and there’s nobody of ours out there.” They said, “You have authorization to fire” so he opened fire with the [tank’s machine gun] – he was satisfied, he did his job, he did what he had to do. The next morning it turns out it was a cow. He made a fool of himself, no doubt. But he couldn’t take the risk it was a person.
rank: Staff Sergeant
unit: Armored Corps
area: Khan Yunis area
period: 2014
When we first entered [the Gaza Strip], when we took over houses, there was this thing of ‘provoking’ the area. If you’re standing for hours and the tank is idle, you don’t start driving back and forth. There’s no comparison between a tank that’s in motion and a tank that’s idle. An idle tank is 1,000 times more vulnerable, and you can’t just drive around for seven hours if you’re stationed at a certain building. So once in a while there were steps we would take to ‘provoke’ the area. What does that mean? It means machine gun fire at ‘suspicious spots.’
What are ‘suspicious spots’?
Bushes, suspicious buildings.
When you fire at a ‘suspicious spot’ that’s a building, do you fire toward the window or toward the corner of the structure?
The corner. You want to ‘provoke’ the area and make sure that if there’s someone in there he won’t suddenly pop his head out and screw you with some anti-tank missile.
You stay inside the vehicles but start shooting at ‘suspicious spots’?
Every few hours, not the whole time. Every five hours that the tank is idle, it’s better to ‘provoke’ the place.
The commander would tell you to shoot ‘provocation fire’ at a preordained time, and the targets were chosen by the tank team? By the tank commander?
Yes, in accordance with what you have around you. You locate ‘suspicious spots’ – one doesn’t need to be a genius to do that. There’s no precise definition, but you know a ‘suspicious spot’ when you see it. You analyze the area, figure out what’s what, which house is tall and has command over you, which windows are pointed right in your direction. And then wham, I fire a burst. You don’t waste shells, you don’t just shoot shells for no reason.
Up to what range can you define something as a ‘suspicious spot?’
Any range. In principle, any house that can see me, that’s within eyeshot of me, which could take me down – can be defined as suspicious. We would scan the entire range – any place within eyeshot.
What’s the farthest point?
Hundreds of meters away from us. I’ll give you a stupid example, it’s even sort of funny. There was one night when someone said, “I saw [movement] over there.” The whole time, of course, we’re on the two-way radio making sure, asking questions – you don’t want to find out that one of your guys went out to take a dump and you accidently shot him. So he said, “I saw it for certain and there’s nobody of ours out there.” They said, “You have authorization to fire” so he opened fire with the [tank’s machine gun] – he was satisfied, he did his job, he did what he had to do. The next morning it turns out it was a cow. He made a fool of himself, no doubt. But he couldn’t take the risk it was a person.
- This testimony appears under these categories: Rules of engagement
- This testimony can also be read in Hebrew
testimony catalog number: 453039
area: Gaza strip
period: 2014
I remember in Shuja’iyya there was one time I needed to interpret an attack that took place on a building or something like that. I opened up the footage, and it was all scorched, burned to the ground. Entire streets where one building is half-destroyed, the next one totally destroyed, the next one half-destroyed.
Entire streets that were totally shelled, and I needed to verify a certain target that had clearly been obliterated. I opened up the footage and saw that it was taken right after the strike had been carried out, and there were lots of people there, and lots of ambulances, and a whole lot of smoke and lots of commotion. And from what we knew, that area was supposedly devoid of civilians.
You said earlier that you did know the neighborhood was supposed to be empty of civilians?
Yes. That’s what they told us. They told us – maybe really so we wouldn’t think the IDF does immoral things – they told us the civilians had been informed via leaflets scattered in the area, and that it was supposed to be devoid of civilians, and civilians who remained there were civilians who apparently chose to be there.
Who told you that?
The commanders, in off-the-record type conversations, or during all kinds of briefings. Just so we’d know, for our general knowledge, that this is what’s going on. That there’s no civilians supposed to be there, and any who are – are there because they chose to be. In conversations between us it was summed up as, “There’s nothing we can do, war is war.” You don’t really talk about it – any discourse or opinions that are slightly ‘deviant’ are pretty much silenced.
area: Gaza strip
period: 2014
I remember in Shuja’iyya there was one time I needed to interpret an attack that took place on a building or something like that. I opened up the footage, and it was all scorched, burned to the ground. Entire streets where one building is half-destroyed, the next one totally destroyed, the next one half-destroyed.
Entire streets that were totally shelled, and I needed to verify a certain target that had clearly been obliterated. I opened up the footage and saw that it was taken right after the strike had been carried out, and there were lots of people there, and lots of ambulances, and a whole lot of smoke and lots of commotion. And from what we knew, that area was supposedly devoid of civilians.
You said earlier that you did know the neighborhood was supposed to be empty of civilians?
Yes. That’s what they told us. They told us – maybe really so we wouldn’t think the IDF does immoral things – they told us the civilians had been informed via leaflets scattered in the area, and that it was supposed to be devoid of civilians, and civilians who remained there were civilians who apparently chose to be there.
Who told you that?
The commanders, in off-the-record type conversations, or during all kinds of briefings. Just so we’d know, for our general knowledge, that this is what’s going on. That there’s no civilians supposed to be there, and any who are – are there because they chose to be. In conversations between us it was summed up as, “There’s nothing we can do, war is war.” You don’t really talk about it – any discourse or opinions that are slightly ‘deviant’ are pretty much silenced.
- This testimony appears under these categories: General, Rules of engagement
- This testimony can also be read in Hebrew
testimony catalog number: 849459
rank: Staff Sergeant
unit: Mechanized infantry
area: Deir al-Balah area
period: 2014
When we entered the [Gaza] Strip, our role as infantry was to take over houses and sort of turn them into little posts. Using the Palestinians’ houses in which we were stationed, we secured the tanks, which were operating mostly in our area. When we entered those houses, it was a very, very violent entrance – with lots of firepower, in order to make sure there wasn’t any hostile force within the structure.
After we had stationed ourselves in the houses, then what’s called ‘post routine’ began. What happens is we start setting up posts – we decide which rooms overlook which directions, and what we can put to use. Every room that’s chosen as a post room, we cover its windows with shading nets, and then we use the house’s curtains. We used nails to attach them to the inside of the windows, and stretched them out with duct tape.
And from that point the guarding routine begins, because you’re on guard duty almost half the time, during which you need to be looking around at what’s happening. While we were stationed there, the armored forces would fire at the surrounding houses all the time. I don’t know what exactly their order was, but it seemed like every house was considered a threat, and so every house needed to be hit by at least one shell, so that there’s no one in there.
The armored [corps] fired a lot, relatively. All the houses around, when you looked at the landscape, they looked sort of like Swiss cheese, with lots of holes in them. Houses were erased during the time we were there – the ground was flattened, it all looked different. Any areas with sheds, the D9s (armored bulldozers) took them down – there was a big greenhouse area there, which was marked on the map as being used for firing [rockets] and storing munitions – the D9 flattened stuff over there, too.
What do markings on maps represent?
They just detail places where according to intelligence there’s a tunnel, or houses that belong to militants, I think, or locations designated as ‘hot spots’ that weren’t exactly defined – training zones, tunnels, launching sites. And booby-traps – places that were booby-trapped were marked.
After you left, were there still any houses left standing?
Hardly any. Once when we went to a house to which we were called, in which there was believed to be a militant, so we walked and the paths were more broken-up wherever the tanks had passed through – it was just sand, it wasn’t agricultural land with plants any longer. Uprooted olive trees everywhere.
The houses themselves were broken, scattered about, a mound where a building once stood, houses simply scattered around. We didn’t actually get an operational order stating that that was the objective – but ultimately, no house was supposed to be left standing. A 500-meter radius where not a single house is left standing.
rank: Staff Sergeant
unit: Mechanized infantry
area: Deir al-Balah area
period: 2014
When we entered the [Gaza] Strip, our role as infantry was to take over houses and sort of turn them into little posts. Using the Palestinians’ houses in which we were stationed, we secured the tanks, which were operating mostly in our area. When we entered those houses, it was a very, very violent entrance – with lots of firepower, in order to make sure there wasn’t any hostile force within the structure.
After we had stationed ourselves in the houses, then what’s called ‘post routine’ began. What happens is we start setting up posts – we decide which rooms overlook which directions, and what we can put to use. Every room that’s chosen as a post room, we cover its windows with shading nets, and then we use the house’s curtains. We used nails to attach them to the inside of the windows, and stretched them out with duct tape.
And from that point the guarding routine begins, because you’re on guard duty almost half the time, during which you need to be looking around at what’s happening. While we were stationed there, the armored forces would fire at the surrounding houses all the time. I don’t know what exactly their order was, but it seemed like every house was considered a threat, and so every house needed to be hit by at least one shell, so that there’s no one in there.
The armored [corps] fired a lot, relatively. All the houses around, when you looked at the landscape, they looked sort of like Swiss cheese, with lots of holes in them. Houses were erased during the time we were there – the ground was flattened, it all looked different. Any areas with sheds, the D9s (armored bulldozers) took them down – there was a big greenhouse area there, which was marked on the map as being used for firing [rockets] and storing munitions – the D9 flattened stuff over there, too.
What do markings on maps represent?
They just detail places where according to intelligence there’s a tunnel, or houses that belong to militants, I think, or locations designated as ‘hot spots’ that weren’t exactly defined – training zones, tunnels, launching sites. And booby-traps – places that were booby-trapped were marked.
After you left, were there still any houses left standing?
Hardly any. Once when we went to a house to which we were called, in which there was believed to be a militant, so we walked and the paths were more broken-up wherever the tanks had passed through – it was just sand, it wasn’t agricultural land with plants any longer. Uprooted olive trees everywhere.
The houses themselves were broken, scattered about, a mound where a building once stood, houses simply scattered around. We didn’t actually get an operational order stating that that was the objective – but ultimately, no house was supposed to be left standing. A 500-meter radius where not a single house is left standing.
- This testimony appears under these categories: House demolitions/razing, Rules of engagement
- This testimony can also be read in Hebrew
